Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Colloquium 1.Christopher A. Dustin - 1993 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):34-56.
  • How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
    The long-standing debate between cognitive and feeling theories of emotion stems, in part, from the assumption that cognition and thought are abstract, intellectual, disembodied processes, and that bodily feelings are non-intentional and have no representational content. Working with this assumption has led many emotions theorists to neglect the way in which emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative. Even hybrid theories, such as those set forth by Prinz and Barlassina and Newen, fail to account fully for how the cognitive and bodily (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Emotional Clichés and Authentic Passions: A Phenomenological Revision of a Cognitive Theory of Emotion.Kym Maclaren - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):45-65.
    This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Justice as an Emotion Disposition.Robert C. Roberts - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):36-43.
    In this tribute to the work of Robert Solomon, I address a topic that occupied him frequently in the last 20 years of his life, and about which he wrote a book and several articles: the relation(s) between the emotions and justice as a personal virtue. I hope to clarify Solomon’s views using three distinctions that seem implicit in his writings, among (1) justice as general virtue and justice as a particular virtue, (2) objective justice and justice as a virtue, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations