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  1. Heuristics and the Generalized Correspondence Principle.Hans Radder - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):195-226.
    Several philosophers of science have claimed that the correspondence principle can be generalized from quantum physics to all of (particularly physical) science and that in fact it constitutes one of the major heuristical rules for the construction of new theories. In order to evaluate these claims, first the use of the correspondence principle in (the genesis of) quantum mechanics will be examined in detail. It is concluded from this and from other examples in the history of science that the principle (...)
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  • Frisch, Muller, and Belot on an Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics.Peter Vickers - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):767-792.
    This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I can (...)
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  • Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences.Fritz Rohrlich - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):295-312.
    It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent (...)
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  • The Pessimistic Meta-Induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?Florian Müller - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):393-412.
    Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current theories should have reached a degree of success (...)
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  • Don’T Blame the Idealizations.Nicholaos Jones - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):85-100.
    Idealizing conditions are scapegoats for scientific hypotheses, too often blamed for falsehood better attributed to less obvious sources. But while the tendency to blame idealizations is common among both philosophers of science and scientists themselves, the blame is misplaced. Attention to the nature of idealizing conditions, the content of idealized hypotheses, and scientists’ attitudes toward those hypotheses shows that idealizing conditions are blameless when hypotheses misrepresent. These conditions help to determine the content of idealized hypotheses, and they do so in (...)
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  • Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism.Fritz Rohrlich - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):73 – 88.
    Building on previous work, I continue the arguments for scientific realism in the presence of a natural level structure of science. That structure results from a cognitive antireductionism that calls for the retention of mature theories even though they have been "superseded". The level structure is based on "scientific truth" characterized by a theory's validity domain and the confirming empirical data. Reductionism (including fundamentalism) fails cognitively because of qualitative differences in the ontology and semantics of successive theories. This cognitive failure (...)
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  • What is Theoretical Progress of Science?Juha Saatsi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):611-631.
    The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally (...)
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  • Quantum Curiosities of Psychophysics.Jeremy Butterfield - 1997 - In J. Cornwell (ed.), Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford University Press.
    I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches are compatible with physicalism, they involve a very different conception of the physical, and of how the physical underpins the mental, from what most philosophers expect. And one (...)
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  • Twentieth-Century Despair & Thomas' Sound Argument for God.Robert C. Trundle - 1996 - Laval Théologique et Philosophique 52 (1):101-123.
  • Modal Rationalism and Constructive Realism: Models and Their Modality.William Kallfelz - manuscript
    I present a case for a rapprochement between aspects of rationalism and scientific realism, by way of a general framework employing modal epistemology and elements of 2-dimensional semantics (2DS). My overall argument strategy is meta-inductive: The bulk of this paper establishes a “base case,” i.e., a concretely constructive example by which I demonstrate this linkage. The base case or constructive example acts as the exemplar for generating, in a constructively ‘bottom-up’ fashion, a more generally rigorous case for rationalism-realism qua modal (...)
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  • Complementarity Meets General Relativity: A Study in Ontological Commitments and Theory Unification.Alexander Rüger - 1989 - Synthese 79 (3):559 - 580.
    The apparent underdetermination of the formalism of quantum field theory (QFT) as between a particle and a field interpretation is studied in this paper through a detour over the problem of unifying QFT with general relativity. All we have at present is a partial or approximate unification, QFT in non-Minkowskian spaces. The nature of this hybrid and the problem of its internal consistency are discussed. One of its most striking implications is that particles do not have an observer-independent existence. We (...)
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  • On Conceptual Issues in Classical Electrodynamics: Prospects and Problems of an Action-at-a-Distance Interpretation.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):67-77.
  • Structuralist Reduction Concepts as Structure-Preserving Maps.Thomas Mormann - 1988 - Synthese 77 (2):215 - 250.
    The aim of this paper is to characterize the various structuralist reduction concepts as structure-preserving maps in a succinct and unifying way. To begin with, some important intuitive adequacy conditions are discussed that a good (structuralist) reduction concept should satisfy. Having reconstructed these intuitive conditions in the structuralist framework, it turns out that they divide into two mutually incompatible sets of requirements. Accordingly there exist (at least) two essentially different types of structuralist reduction concepts: the first type stresses the existence (...)
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  • Philosophical Issues in Electromagnetism.Mathias Frisch - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):255-270.
    This paper provides a survey of several philosophical issues arising in classical electrodynamics arguing that there is a philosophically rich set of problems in theories of classical physics that have not yet received the attention by philosophers that they deserve. One issue, which is connected to the philosophy of causation, concerns the temporal asymmetry exhibited by radiation fields in the presence of wave sources. Physicists and philosophers disagree on whether this asymmetry reflects a fundamental causal asymmetry or is due to (...)
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  • Four Philosophical Issues Essential for Good Science Teaching.Fritz Rohrlich - 1988 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 20 (2):1–6.
  • Four Philosophical Issues Essential for Good Science Teaching.Fritz Rohrlich - 1988 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 20 (2):1-6.
  • Approximate Truth, Idealization, and Ontology.Robert John Schwartz - 1990 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):409-425.
  • Theories Between Theories: Asymptotic Limiting Intertheoretic Relations.Robert W. Batterman - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):171 - 201.
    This paper addresses a relatively common scientific (as opposed to philosophical) conception of intertheoretic reduction between physical theories. This is the sense of reduction in which one (typically newer and more refined) theory is said to reduce to another (typically older and coarser) theory in the limit as some small parameter tends to zero. Three examples of such reductions are discussed: First, the reduction of Special Relativity (SR) to Newtonian Mechanics (NM) as (v/c)20; second, the reduction of wave optics to (...)
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