Switch to: References

Citations of:

Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten

In Jürgen Stolzenberg (ed.), Kant in der Gegenwart. De Gruyter. pp. 167-212 (2007)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. IX—Closing the Gap: A New Answer to an Old Objection Against Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):181-203.
    In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ objection against Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.Clinton Tolley - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.
    There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of ‘content’ in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of ‘sense ’, understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism.Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):77-101.
    Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Worlds and Two Aspects: On Kant’s Distinction Between Things in Themselves and Appearances.Michael Oberst - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (1):53-75.
    In the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, a textual stalemate between two camps has evolved: two-world interpretations regard things in themselves and appearances as two numerically distinct entities, whereas two-aspect interpretations take this distinction as one between two aspects of the same thing. I try to develop an account which can overcome this dispute. On the one hand, things in themselves are numerically distinct from appearances, but on the other hand, things in themselves can be regarded as they exist in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 Pp. Xi + 320 ISBN 9780198747130. [REVIEW]Michael Oberst - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):157-161.
  • Reality in-Itself and the Ground of Causality.Christian Onof - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (2):197-222.
    This article presents a metaphysical approach to the interpretation of the role of things-in-themselves in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. This focuses upon identifying their transcendental function as the grounding of appearances. It is interpreted as defining the relation of appearing as the grounding of empirical causality. This leads to a type of dual-aspect account that is given further support through a detailed examination of two sections of Kant’s first Critique. This shows the need to embed this dual-aspect account within a two-perspective (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Idealism Enough: Response to Roche.Lucy Allais - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (3):375-398.
  • Allais on Transcendental Idealism.Andrew F. Roche - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (3):351-374.
    Lucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant's transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in the Prolegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais's position and its benefits, not least of which is its (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations