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  1. The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
    According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and the (...)
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  • Locating Color: Further Thoughts.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):146-156.
    "The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" response to commentators.
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  • Observational Concepts and Experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    The thesis is intended to contribute to the growing understanding of the indispensable role played by phenomenal consciousness in human cognition, and specifically in making our concepts of the external world available. The focus falls on so called observational concepts, a type of rudimentary, perceptually-based objective concepts in our repertoire — picking out manifest properties such as colors and shapes. A theory of such concepts gets provided, and, consequently, the exact role that perceptual consciousness plays in making concepts of this (...)
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  • Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto.Jonathan Cohen - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.
    Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that color (...)
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  • Fisicalismo científicamente compatible. La disputa entre la ciencia y el sentido común sobre la naturaleza de los colores.Andoni Ibarra & Ekai Txapartegi - 2006 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 30 (2):35-59.
    Physicalism claims that colors are physical properties of physical objects. For more than three centuries this philosophical stand has been denied because it was considered not to be “scientifically serious”. In this article we offer a critical review of the history of this accusation to conclude that the apparent incompatibility between the best science and physicalism must be, at least, re-examined.
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