Switch to: References

Citations of:

Interpersonal Obligation in Joint Action

In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 45-57 (2018)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist Account.Jules Salomone - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1120-1140.
    Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations.Guido Löhr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13035-13052.
    It is largely assumed that conceptual engineering is essentially about revising, introducing, or eliminating representational devices, in particular the intension and extension of words and concepts. However, tying conceptual engineering too closely to representations is risky. Not everyone endorses the notion of representation as theoretically helpful or even real. Not everyone thinks that concepts or meanings should be understood in terms of the notion of representation. Does this mean that conceptual engineering is not interesting or relevant for these skeptics? In (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Logical Structure of Normative Attitudes.José Giromini - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1271-1291.
    In contemporary social ontology, normative attitudes are often regarded as the essential element to account for the existence of the social/normative realm. However, by emphasizing their foundational explanatory role, philosophers have been led to overlook or misrepresent some aspects of their structure. The first part of this paper attempts to offer a more proportioned analysis of the structure of normative attitudes; according to it, normative attitudes are essentially _sanctions_ that have a _projective_ or _generalizing_ aim, that is, sanctions that manage (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark