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  1. The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 286-306.
    I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...)
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  • When it takes a bad person to do the right thing.Eric Luis Uhlmann, Luke Zhu & David Tannenbaum - 2013 - Cognition 126 (2):326-334.
  • The puzzle of wrongless harms: Some potential concerns for dyadic morality and related accounts.Edward B. Royzman & Samuel H. Borislow - 2022 - Cognition 220 (C):104980.
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  • Kinds of norms.Elizabeth O'Neill - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12416.
    This article provides an overview of recent, empirically supported categorization schemes that have been proposed to distinguish different kinds of norms. Amongst these are the moral–conventional distinction and divisions within moral norms such as those proposed by moral foundations theory. I identify several dimensions along which norms have been and could usefully be categorized. I discuss some of the most prominent norm categorization proposals and the aims of these existing categorization schemes. I propose that we take a pluralistic approach toward (...)
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  • Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?William H. B. McAuliffe - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (2):207-230.
    The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, (...)
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  • Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative Judgment.Chiara Lisciandra, Marie Postma-Nilsenová & Matteo Colombo - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (4):751-764.
    How does other people’s opinion affect judgments of norm transgressions? In our study, we used a modification of the famous Asch paradigm to examine conformity in the moral domain. The question we addressed was how peer group opinion alters normative judgments of scenarios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results indicate that even moral norms are subject to conformity, especially in situations with a high degree of social presence. Interestingly, the degree of conformity can distinguish between different (...)
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  • Incidental disgust does not cause moral condemnation of neutral actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - forthcoming - Tandf: Cognition and Emotion:1-14.
  • Incidental disgust does not cause moral condemnation of neutral actions.Jussi Jylkkä, Johanna Härkönen & Jukka Hyönä - 2021 - Cognition and Emotion 35 (1):96-109.
  • A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.
    What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action (...)
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  • Reasoning in moral conflicts.Monica Bucciarelli & Margherita Daniele - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (3):265-294.
    Following the assumptions of the mental model theory and its account of moral judgements, we argue for a main role of reasoning in moral judgements, especially in dealing with moral conflicts. In four experiments, we invited adult participants to evaluate scenarios describing moral or immoral actions. Our results confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions: Given a moral or immoral scenario, the manipulation of the propositions which refer to norms and values results in a scenario eliciting a moral conflict ; (...)
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  • Moral dilemmas in females: children are more utilitarian than adults.Monica Bucciarelli - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:149174.
    Influential theories on moral judgments propose that they rely either on emotions or on innate moral principles. In contrast, the mental model theory postulates that moral judgments rely on reasoning, either intuition or deliberation. The theory allows for the possibility that intuitions lead to utilitarian judgments. This paper reports two experiments involving fifth-grade children, adolescents, and adults; the results revealed that children reason intuitively to resolve moral dilemmas in which action and inaction lead to different outcomes. In particular, the results (...)
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  • Delineating The Moral Domain in Moral Psychology.Renatas Berniūnas - 2014 - Problemos 86:90-101.
    The aim of this paper is to review current debate about the moral domain in the moral psychological literature. There is some vagueness in respect to the usage of the very concept of ‘morality’. This conceptual problem recently has been re-addressed by several authors. So far, there is little agreement, nobody seems to agree about how to delineate the moral domain from other ‘non-moral’ normative domains. Currently, there are several positions that disagree about the scope of morality, ranging from complete (...)
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