Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):579-598.
    Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on “irrelevant” contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are “distorted” by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an “inner rational agent.” I argue that this model is psychologically (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reason-Based Rationalization.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - manuscript
    [This version of the paper has been superseded by "Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework", forthcoming in Economics & Philosophy.] -/- We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Aggregating Causal Judgments.Bradley Richards, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Reason-Based Choice and Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):175-229.
    We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Back to Buchanan? Explorations of Welfare and Subjectivism in Behavioral Economics.Malte F. Dold - 2018 - Journal of Economic Methodology 25 (2):160-178.
    In light of behavioral findings regarding inconsistent individual decision-making, economists have begun to re-conceptualize the notion of welfare. One prominent account is the preference purification approach, which attempts to reconstruct preferences from choice data based on a normative understanding of neoclassical rationality. Using Buchanan’s notion of creative choice, this paper criticizes PP’s epistemic, ontological, and psychological assumptions. It identifies PP as a static position that assumes the satisfaction of given ‘true preferences’ as the normative standard for welfare. However, following Buchanan, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Comments on Neuroeconomics.Ariel Rubinstein - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):485-494.
    Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Eliciting Welfare Preferences From Behavioral Datasets.Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A behavioral dataset contains various preference orderings displayed by the same individual in different payoff-irrelevant circumstances. We introduce a framework for eliciting the individual’s underlying preferences in such cases, in which it is conjectured that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences. We then demonstrate for two cognitive processes how to elicit the individual’s underlying preferences from behavioral datasets.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark