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  1. A Challenge for Soft Line Replies to Manipulation Cases.Gerald K. Harrison - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):555-568.
    Cases involving certain kinds of manipulation seem to challenge compatibilism about responsibility-grounding free will. To deal with such cases many compatibilists give what has become known as a ‘soft line’ reply. In this paper I present a challenge to the soft line reply. I argue that any relevant case involving manipulation—and to which a compatibilist might wish to give a soft line reply—can be transformed into one supporting a degree of moral responsibility through the addition of libertarian elements (such as (...)
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  • Modest Libertarianism and Clandestine Control.Gerald K. Harrison - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):495-507.
    Cases involving clandestine manipulation pose a significant challenge to compatibilist conceptions of free will. But compatibilists often argue that they are not alone and that modest libertarian conceptions of free will are also susceptible to the problem. I take issue with this claim. I argue that agent-causal libertarian views are not susceptible to the problem. I then argue that the compatibilist cannot cite a relevant difference between agent-causal libertarian views and modest libertarian views. Therefore from a compatibilist's perspective modest libertarian (...)
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  • Modest Libertarianism and Clandestine Control.Gerald K. Harrison - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):495-507.
    Cases involving clandestine manipulation pose a significant challenge to compatibilist conceptions of free will. But compatibilists often argue that they are not alone and that modest libertarian conceptions of free will are also susceptible to the problem. I take issue with this claim. I argue that agent‐causal libertarian views are not susceptible to the problem. I then argue that the compatibilist cannot cite a relevant difference between agent‐causal libertarian views and modest libertarian views. Therefore from a compatibilist's perspective modest libertarian (...)
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