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Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1

Oxford University Press (2006)

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  1. Moral assertion for expressivists.Mike Ridge - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):182-204.
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  • Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology.James Harold - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):165 - 185.
    In recent years it has become more and more difficult to distinguish between metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. For example, proponents of the minimalist theory of truth hold that moral claims need not express beliefs in order to be (minimally) truth-apt, and yet some of these proponents still reject the traditional cognitivist analysis of moral language and thought. Thus, the dispute in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists has come to be seen as a dispute over the correct way to characterize our (...)
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