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Philosophical Review 87 (3):472 (1978)

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  1. Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.
    We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they (...)
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  • Emoción y percepción: una aproximación ecológica.José Ramón Torices - 2017 - Análisis Filosófico 37 (1):5-26.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of emotion. Our thesis is that emotional experience is a type of perceptual experience. Agents perceive emotionally the world whose objects and situations present to them as being relevant to their well-being and they do it by means of practical relations towards their environment. Our proposal attempts to avoid, in this way, the problem of some classical theories of emotions such as James’s theory of emotions as feelings and cognitivist theories (...)
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  • Zhuang Zi and the Education of the Emotions.Jeffrey Morgan - 2018 - Comparative Philosophy 9 (1).
    This paper examines and defends a conception of the education of emotions found in the Zhuang-Zi. I begin by exploring four principal features of Zhuang Zi’s philosophy as it relates to the emotions: his epistemological perspectivism, his view of the self, his ethics of wandering and natural spontaneity, and his playful non-seriousness. Together these four features allow us to discern a general orientation to the education of the emotions, including a normative account of a good emotional life as well some (...)
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  • A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. (...)
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  • Sentimental Perceptualism and the Challenge From Cognitive Bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.
    According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access (...)
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  • The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.
    Both through his own work and that of his students, Franz Clemens Brentano had an often underappreciated influence on the course of 20 th - and 21 st -century philosophy. _The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School_ offers full coverage of Brentano’s philosophy and his influence. It contains 38 brand-new essays from an international team of experts that offer a comprehensive view of Brentano’s central research areas—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and value theory—as well as of the principal (...)
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  • Introspection Without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call (...)
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  • In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...)
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  • Emptiness and the Education of the Emotions.Jeffrey Morgan - 2015 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (3):291-304.
    This article argues that Buddhist philosophy offers a plausible theory of the education of the emotions. Emotions are analyzed as cognitive feeling events in which the subject is passive. The education of the emotions is possible if and only if it is possible to evaluate one’s emotional life and it is possible to satisfy the normative condition through learning. Drawing on the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, as well as the concepts of conditioned arising, emptiness and anattā, the article presents (...)
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  • Getting Emotional Over Contours: Response to Seeley.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (2):518-521.
    Bill Seeley suggests that what follows from research into crossmodal perception for expression and emotion in the arts is that there is an emotional contour (i.e., a contour constitutive of the content of an emotion and potentially realizable across a range of media). As a response of sorts, I speculate as to what this might hold for philosophical and empirical enquiry into expression and emotion across the arts as well as into the nature of the emotions themselves.
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  • What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?Raamy Majeed - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 51-69.
    What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper (...)
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  • The Meaning of Feeling:Banishing the Homunculus From Psychology.Joshua Soffer - 2011 - Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts 12 (1):1-29.
    Current approaches in psychology have replaced the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a diffuse system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded. However, the failure of contemporary perspectives to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may result in the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part. In this paper (...)
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  • The Other Dimension of Caring Thinking.Ann Margaret Sharp - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy in Schools 1 (1).
    Life comes from physical or biological survival. But the good life comes from what we care about, what we value, what we think truly important, as distinguished from what we think merely trivial. What we care about is the source of the criteria we use to evaluate ideas, ideals, persons, events, things, and their importance in our lives. And it is these criteria that determine the judgments we make in our everyday lives. In the second edition of Thinking in Education, (...)
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  • Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2017 - Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers.
    REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness and range of Kochan's (...)
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  • In Defence of “Emotion”. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
  • Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect.Louis C. Charland - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  • The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem.Louis Charland - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
    Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...)
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  • Why Die – a Philosophical Apology of Death.Heine A. Holmen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79 (1-2):136-155.
    In the Insanity Defence Woody Allen claims that when we say humans are mortal we are obviously not complimenting them. It is difficult to contradict great comedy, of course, but if what I argue holds, Allen is wrong on this account. Mortality is a compliment – or at least something for which we should be grateful – since life without it threatens with disaster. To live without death also means living in the universe in its more hostile stages under conditions (...)
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  • A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
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  • Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
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  • The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.
    A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my (...)
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  • Ästhetische Erfahrung und Quasi-Gefühl.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2013 - Meinong Studien 4.
    Vor etwa einem Jahrhundert entwickelte sich im deutschsprachigen Raum imRahmen einer allgemeinen Charakterisierung unserer ästhetischen Erfahrungvon Kunst eine umfassende Debatte über die Natur und die Möglichkeit vonGefühlen über fiktionale Charaktere und Situationen. Die damalige Debatteweist große Ähnlichkeit zur heutigen analytischen Debatte über das Paradoxonder Fiktion auf. Trotz des unterschiedlichen jeweiligen historischen Kontextesfindet sich in der analytischen Debatte und in der Philosophie zu Beginn des20. Jahrhunderts fast der gleiche Lösungsansatz. Gefühle über Fiktionen seienQuasi-Gefühle, d.h. ein gefühlsartiges Phänomen mit einer Realität sui (...)
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  • Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
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  • Emotions and Wellbeing.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):461-474.
    In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...)
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  • Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive.Rick Anthony Furtak - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  • Guilt, Embarrassment, and Global Character Traits Associated with Helping.Christian Miller - 2011 - In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The first section of this paper briefly summarizes my positive view of global helping traits. The remaining sections then develop the view in two new directions by examining the relationship between guilt, embarrassment, and helping behavior. It turns out that guilt and embarrassment reliably and cross-situationally enhance helping behavior, but in such a way that is incompatible with the nature of compassion as traditionally understood.
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  • Machiavelli’s Realist Image of Humanity and His Justification of the State.Manuel Knoll - 2018 - Filozofija I Društvo 29 (2):182-201.
    This article examines Machiavelli’s image of humanity. It argues against the prevailing views that characterize it either as pessimistic or optimistic and defends the thesis that the Florentine has a realist image of humanity. Machiavelli is a psychological egoist who conceives of man as a being whose actions are motivated by his drives, appetites, and passions, which lead him often to immoral behavior. Man’s main drives are “ambition” (ambizione) and “avarice” (avarizia). This article also investigates Machiavelli’s concept of nature and (...)
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  • Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion.James A. Russell - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (1):145-172.
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  • Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):626-635.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 infallibilism has no explanation (...)
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  • Irrational Blame.Hanna Pickard - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):613-626.
    I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a feeling of entitlement—a feeling that (...)
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  • Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - In Calabi Clotilde (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 207-24.
    Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...)
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  • Philosophie als Medicina Mentis? Zu den Voraussetzungen und Grenzen eines umstrittenen Philosophiebegriffs.Ursula Renz - 2010 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (1):17-30.
    In ancient as well as in early modern theories of emotion, philosophy is often described as some kind of therapy. However, the assumption that philosophical reflection can influence our emotional life is only plausible, if the following requirements are met. First, one has to defend a realist account of self-knowledge. Second, one must allow for some kind of constructivism in regard to the description of one′s own experience. Finally, one has to maintain a strictly cognitivist conception of emotion. The article (...)
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  • Chasing the Bear: William James on Senstations, Emotions and Instincts.Anna Stoklosa - 2012 - William James Studies 9 (1).
    William James’s account of emotions is frequently categorised as a feeling theory of emotions. Consideration of James’s views about sensations, however, reveals that this categorisation is untenable. Instead, many of James’s emotions are more appropriately categorised as instincts. The categorisation of emotions as instincts entails that emotions do have a function–contrary to a criticism often levied against James’s account.
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  • Appropriate Emotions and the Metaphysics of Time.Olley Pearson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1945-1961.
    Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to (...)
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  • How to Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects for a New Methodology.Attila Tanyi & Martin Bruder - 2014 - In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 157-174.
    Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the (...)
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  • Investigating Emotions Philosophically.Michael McEachrane - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):342-357.
    This paper is a defense of investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use as a philosophical method for investigating the emotions. The paper defends such conceptual analysis against the critique that it is short of empirical grounding and at best reflects current “common-sense beliefs.” Such critique harks back to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of “linguistic philosophy” as sanctifying our ordinary use of words, (...)
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  • Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  • Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.Paul E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...)
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  • Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?Rick Repetti (ed.) - 2016 - London, UK: Routledge / Francis & Taylor.
    A collection of essays, mostly original, on the actual and possible positions on free will available to Buddhist philosophers, by Christopher Gowans, Rick Repetti, Jay Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Charles Goodman, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Martin T. Adam, Christian Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, B. Alan Wallace, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, and Karin Meyers, and a Foreword by Daniel Cozort.
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  • Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
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  • Exemplars as Evaluative Ideals in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Value.Jonanthan Mitchell - unknown
    The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of value by examining his exemplars. It will be argued that these exemplars represent his favoured evaluative practices and therefore illustrate what I will call his evaluative ideals. The thesis will be structured in three chapters, each examining a different exemplar that emerges from a particular period of Nietzsche’s work. Proceeding in this way will allow me to examine what I take to be three strands of (...)
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  • Emotion and Action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.
    The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotion's place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent (...)
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  • Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.A. Scarantino - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):729-768.
    Philosophical cognitivists have argued for more than four decades that emotions are special types of judgments. Anti-cognitivists have provided a series of counterexamples aiming to show that identifying emotions with judgments overintellectualizes the emotions. I provide a novel counterexample that makes the overintellectualization charge especially vivid. I discuss neurophysiological evidence to the effect that the fear system can be activated by stimuli the subject is unaware of seeing. To emphasize the analogy with blind sight , I call this phenomenon blind (...)
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  • Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142 (4):529-548.
    In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. (...)
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  • Background-Mood in Emotional Creativity: A Microanalysis.L. Sundararajan - 2000 - Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):227-243.
    Background mood differs from focal emotions in that it is an inchoate “bodily felt sense” rather than full fledged emotional syndromes such as anger, sadness, etc. Microanalysis of a Focusing therapy session is made to illustrate how the cultivation and maintenance of background mood with its characteristic double vision is essential to emotional creativity.
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  • Pragmatism and Metaethics.Andrew Sepielli - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 582-594.
  • On Emotion and Rationality: A Response to Barrett.Ellis Van Dam & Jan Steutel - 1996 - Journal of Moral Education 25 (4):395-400.
    Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so?called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barrett's criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomon's view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the (...)
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  • Emociones, valores y moral.Holmer Steinfath - 2014 - Universitas Philosophica 31 (63).
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  • Shame as an Interpersonal Dimension of Communication Among Doctoral Students: An Empirical Phenomenological Study.Halina Ablamowicz - 1992 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 23 (1):30-49.
    Current conceptions of shame emphasize its negative communication value as a phenomenon of conscious experience. A tendency in our contemporary society is to view this phenomenon as an extremely disparaging and undesirable experience that every person should avoid or eliminate. It has become a cultural norm now that shame, perceived as human failure or sickness, is to be rejected, hidden, and not discussed. It is believed to stand in the way of personal progress and self-realization. The research literature mirrors not (...)
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  • Commentary on Sherman.Maud H. Chaplin - 2000 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):82-90.
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