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  1. Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73.
    According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this (...)
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  • Does Studying ‘Ethics’ Improve Engineering Students’ Meta-Moral Cognitive Skills?Reena Cheruvalath - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics 25 (2):583-596.
    This study examines the assumption that training in professional ethics is a predictor of the meta-moral cognitive ability of engineering students. The main purpose of the study was to check the difference in the meta-moral cognitive abilities between those students who studied a course on professional ethics, as part of the engineering curriculum, and those who did not undertake such a course. Using the survey method, the author conducted a pilot study amongst 243 engineering undergraduates. The meta-moral cognitive awareness inventory (...)
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  • Moral Disagreement and Non-Moral Ignorance.Nicholas Smyth - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    The existence of deep and persistent moral disagreement poses a problem for a defender of moral knowledge. It seems particularly clear that a philosopher who thinks that we know a great many moral truths should explain how human populations have failed to converge on those truths. In this paper, I do two things. First, I show that the problem is more difficult than it is often taken to be, and second, I criticize a popular response, which involves claiming that many (...)
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  • Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?William H. B. McAuliffe - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (2):207-230.
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  • Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate.Michael Lacewing - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):1-17.
    In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into moral expertise, outlining (...)
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  • Can’T We All Disagree More Constructively? Moral Foundations, Moral Reasoning, and Political Disagreement.Hanno Sauer - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (2):153-169.
    Can’t we all disagree more constructively? Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in political partisanship: the 2013 shutdown of the US government as well as an ever more divided political landscape in Europe illustrate that citizens and representatives of developed nations fundamentally disagree over virtually every significant issue of public policy, from immigration to health care, from the regulation of financial markets to climate change, from drug policies to medical procedures. The emerging field of political psychology brings the tools (...)
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  • Questioning Intuition Through Reflective Engagement.Christopher D. Schmidt - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (4):429-446.
    Current literature on ethics and moral development focuses on discussion concerning the impact of intuition on moral decision-making. Through the use of student journal reflections over the course of one semester, this study utilized a grounded theory approach in order to explore and understand participant levels of awareness and understanding of intuition in this regard. The findings suggest that reflective engagement enables these participants to become more aware of and therefore access and govern intuitions so that they can be more (...)
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  • Two Types of Debunking Arguments.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):383-402.
    Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories (...)
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  • A Developmental Theory for Aristotelian Practical Intelligence.Matt Ferkany - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education:1-18.
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  • Using Insights From Applied Moral Psychology to Promote Ethical Behavior Among Engineering Students and Professional Engineers.Scott Gelfand - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (5):1513-1534.
    In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent moral reasoning and ethical decision-making (...)
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  • Assessing Two Competing Approaches to the Psychology of Moral Judgments.Christian B. Miller - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):28-47.
    This paper brings together the social intuitionist view of the psychology of moral judgments developed by Jonathan Haidt, and the recent morphological rationalist position of Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. I will end up suggesting that Horgan and Timmons have offered us a more plausible account of the psychology of moral judgment formation. But the view is not without its own difficulties. Indeed, one of them might prove to be quite serious, as it could support a form of skepticism about (...)
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  • Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):195-216.
    People sometimes make moral judgments on the basis of brief emotional episodes. I follow the widely established practice of referring to such affective responses as intuitions (Haidt 2001, 2012; Bedke 2012, Copp 2012). Recently, a number of moral psychologists have argued that moral judgments are never more than emotion- or intuition-based pronouncements on what is right or wrong (Haidt 2001, Nichols 2004, Prinz 2007). A wide variety of empirical findings seem to support this claim. For example, some argue that arbitrary (...)
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  • Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...)
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  • On the Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience and Dual-Process Theory.Peter Königs - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):195-209.
    According to the dual-process account of moral judgment, deontological and utilitarian judgments stem from two different cognitive systems. Deontological judgments are effortless, intuitive and emotion-driven, whereas utilitarian judgments are effortful, reasoned and dispassionate. The most notable evidence for dual-process theory comes from neuroimaging studies by Joshua Greene and colleagues. Greene has suggested that these empirical findings undermine deontology and support utilitarianism. It has been pointed out, however, that the most promising interpretation of his argument does not make use of the (...)
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  • Is Intuition Associated with Ethical Decision-Making?Jen-Sheng Liao, Yen-Yi Chung & Wen-Cheng Huang - 2018 - Hts Theological Studies 74 (1).
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