Switch to: References

Citations of:

Essays on moral realism

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1988)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Philosophia Semper Reformanda: Husserlian Theses on Constitution.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2000 - Manuscrito 23 (2):251-274.
    Starting from the sensuous perception of what is seen, an attempt is made at re-casting a Husserlian theory of constitution of the object of intuition, as one leaves the natural attitude through a transcendental method, by positing several theses so as to avoid the aporias of philosophical binary oppositions such as rationalism and empiri-cism, realism and idealism, logicism and psychologism, subjectivism and objectivism, transcendentalism and ontologism, metaphysics and positivism. Throughout fifty-five theses on constitution, the Husserlian proposal of continuously reforming philosophizing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naturalism and Moral Realism.Michael C. Rea - 2006 - In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 215-242.
    My goal in this paper is to show that naturalists cannot reasonably endorse moral realism. My argument will come in two parts. The first part aims to show that any plausible and naturalistically acceptable argument in favor of belief in objective moral properties will appeal in part to simplicity considerations (broadly construed)—and this regardless of whether moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. The second part argues for the conclusion that appeals to simplicity justify belief in moral properties only if (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Theories of welfare, theories of good reasons for action, and ontological naturalism.Brad Hooker - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (1):25-36.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Experimental moral philosophy began to emerge as a methodology inthe last decade of the twentieth century, a branch of the largerexperimental philosophy approach. From the beginning,it has been embroiled in controversy on a number of fronts. Somedoubt that it is philosophy at all. Others acknowledge that it isphilosophy but think that it has produced modest results at best andconfusion at worst. Still others think it represents an important advance., Before the research program can be evaluated, we should have someconception of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem.Charles R. Pigden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441-456.
    Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Tractatus ethico-politicus.Nythamar De Oliveira - 1999 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Edipucrs.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Tractatus practico-theoreticus.Nythamar De Oliveira - 2016 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Editora Fi.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism.Lei Zhong - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):309-325.
    It is generally believed that moral reductionism is immune from notorious problems in moral metaphysics and epistemology, such as the problem of moral explanation – it is at least on this dimension that moral reductionism scores better than moral anti- reductionism. However, in this article I reject this popular view. First, I argue that moral reductionism fails to help vindicate the explanatory efficacy of moral properties because the reductionist solution is either circular or otiose. Second, I attempt to show that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Prospects for non-cognitivism.Catherine Wilson - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):291 – 314.
    This essay offers a defence of the non-cognitivist approach to the interpretation of moral judgments as disguised imperatives corresponding to social rules. It addresses the body of criticism that faced R. M. Hare, and that currently faces moral anti-realists, on two levels, by providing a full semantic analysis of evaluative judgments and by arguing that anti-realism is compatible with moral aspiration despite the non-existence of obligations as the externalist imagines them. A moral judgment consists of separate descriptive and prescriptive components (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Is Ethical Expertise Possible?Jukka Varelius - 2008 - Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 11 (2):127-132.
    Services of ethics committees are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as health care, public administration, business, law, engineering, and scientific research. It is taken that as their members have expertise in ethics, these committees can have valuable contributions to make in solving practical moral problems. It has, however, also been maintained that it is simply absurd to claim that one has some special knowledge and skills in moral matters; in connection with moral questions there is no (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):26-46.
    This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, but for little-noticed reasons. A (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
    Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  • Moral Realism and Kantian Constructivism.James A. Stieb - 2006 - Ratio Juris 19 (4):402-420.
    . This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont makes about “the validity of social norms” and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties.David Slutsky - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):595-610.
    In this paper, I motivate skepticism about the causal efficacy of moral properties in two ways. First, I highlight a tension that arises between two claims that moral realists may want to accept. The first claim is that physically indistinguishable things do not differ in any causally efficacious respect. The second claim is that physically indistinguishable things that differ in certain historical respects have different moral properties. The tension arises to the extent to which these different moral properties are supposed (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Confirmation theory and moral justification.Edward D. Sherline - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):225 - 238.
    I defend a naturalist theory of moral justification, "Confirmation Theory", from an objection raised by David Copp and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Confirmation Theory holds that some moral theory is justified because it is needed in the best empirical explanation of the world. The objection is that moral explanations are "incidental", that even if a moral theory is indispensable, this doesn't establish that any moral standard is justified. I show that the naturalist can concede that moral explanations are incidental and still maintain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral facts and the problem of justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):368 – 388.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Sub Specie Aeternitatis Perspective and Normative Evaluations of Life’s Meaningfulness: A Closer Look.Joshua W. Seachris - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):605-620.
    It is a common pessimistic worry among both philosophers and non-philosophers that our lives, viewed sub specie aeternitatis, are meaningless given that they make neither a noticeable nor lasting impact from this vast, cosmic perspective. The preferred solution for escaping this kind of pessimism is to adopt a different measure by which to evaluate life’s meaningfulness. One of two primary routes is often taken here. First, one can retreat back to the sub specie humanitatis perspective, and argue that life is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism.Scott M. James - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):215-233.
    An increasingly popular moral argument has it that the story of human evolution shows that we can explain the human disposition to make moral judgments without relying on a realm of moral facts. Such facts can thus be dispensed with. But this argument is a threat to moral realism only if there is no realist position that can explain, in the context of human evolution, the relationship between our particular moral sense and a realm of moral facts. I sketch a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Evolutionary naturalistic justifications of morality: A matter of faith and works. [REVIEW]William A. Rottschaefer - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (3):341-349.
    Robert Richards has presented a detailed defense of evolutionary ethics, a revised version of Darwin's views and a major modification of E. O. Wilson's. He contends that humans have evolved to seek the community welfare by acting altruistically. And since the community welfare is the highest moral good, humans ought to act altruistically. Richards asks us to take his empirical premises on faith and aims to show how they can justify an ethical conclusion. He identifies two necessary conditions for a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • How is Sociological Realism Possible?: Sociology after Cognitive Science.Patrick Pharo - 2007 - European Journal of Social Theory 10 (3):481-496.
    This article explores the limits of social constructionism and criticizes the `demiurgic conception of society' associated with it. It contemplates the possibility of sociological realism by investigating the intrinsic and objective properties of action, cognition and morality. The incorporation of intrinsic meanings and intentions in social actions, the objective information supporting cognitive processes and human sensitivity to pleasure and pain as well as the normative rejection of undue suffering, delineate the objective core of social facts, which can be interpreted or (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ambiguous Reference.Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos & Ron Mallon - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):145-175.
    One of the central debates in the philosophy of language is that between defenders of the causal-historical and descriptivist theories of reference. Most philosophers involved in the debate support one or the other of the theories. Building on recent experimental work in semantics, we argue that there is a sense in which both theories are correct. In particular, we defend the view that natural kind terms can sometimes take on a causal-historical reading and at other times take on a descriptivist (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
    In this paper, I hope to provide an account of the conditions of moral realism whereby there are still significant metaphysical commitments made by the realist which set the view apart as a distinct position in the contemporary meta-ethical landscape. In order to do so, I will be appealing to a general account of what it is for realism to be true in any domain of experience, whether it be realism about universals, realism about unobservable scientific entities, realism about artifacts, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Many Moral Particularisms.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83-106.
    What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Moral explanation.Brad Majors - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):1–15.
    Discussion of moral explanation has reached an impasse, with proponents of contemporary ethical naturalism upholding the explanatory integrity of moral facts and properties, and opponents--including both antirealists and non-naturalistic realists--insisting that such robustly explanatory pretensions as moral theory has be explained away. I propose that the key to solving the problem lies in the question whether instances of moral properties are causally efficacious. It is argued that, given the truth of contemporary ethical naturalism, moral properties are causally efficacious if the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The moral requirement in theistic and secular ethics.Patrick Loobuyck - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (2):192-207.
    One of the central tasks of meta-ethical inquiry is to accommodate the common-sense assumptions deeply embedded in our moral discourse. A comparison of the potential of secular and theistic ethics shows that, in the end, theists have a greater facility in achieving this accommodation task; it is easier to appreciate the action-guiding authority and binding nature of morality in a theistic rather than in a secular context. Theistic ethics has a further advantage in being able to accommodate not only this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The ethical foundations of behavior therapy.Richard F. Kitchener - 1991 - Ethics and Behavior 1 (4):221 – 238.
    In this article, I am concerned with the ethical foundations of behavior therapy, that is, with the normative ethics and the meta-ethics underlying behavior therapy. In particular, I am concerned with questions concerning the very possibility of providing an ethical justification for things done in the context of therapy. Because behavior therapists must be able to provide an ethical justification for various actions (if the need arises), certain meta-ethical views widely accepted by behavior therapists must be abandoned: in particular, one (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Realism and anti-realism in Kant's second critique.Patrick Kain - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Naturalistic nursing.Trevor Hussey - 2011 - Nursing Philosophy 12 (1):45-52.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597.
    Ethical naturalists interpret moral knowledge as analogous to scientific knowledge and not dependent on intuition. For their account to succeed, moral truths must explain observable phenomena, and these explanations (i) must be better than any explanations framed in non-moral terms, (ii) must not rely on ad hoc posits about the causal powers of moral properties, and (iii) must not presuppose the existence of an independent means of awareness of moral truths. No moral explanations satisfy these criteria.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Bibliography.Richard Holton - 2000 - Philosophical Inquiry 22 (4):112-112.
    We aim to find a middle path between disease models of addiction, and those that treat addictive choices as choices like any other. We develop an account of the disease element by focussing on the idea that dopamine works primarily to lay down dispositional intrinsic desires. Addictive substances artifically boost the dopamine signal, and thereby lay down intrinsic desires for the substances that persist through withdrawal, and in the face of beliefs that they are worthless. The result is cravings that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Functionalism’s Methodological Predicament.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):77-94.
  • Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?Paul Formosa - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196.
    The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Poincaré's conception of the objectivity of mathematics.Janet Folina - 1994 - Philosophia Mathematica 2 (3):202-227.
    There is a basic division in the philosophy of mathematics between realist, ‘platonist’ theories and anti-realist ‘constructivist’ theories. Platonism explains how mathematical truth is strongly objective, but it does this at the cost of invoking mind-independent mathematical objects. In contrast, constructivism avoids mind-independent mathematical objects, but the cost tends to be a weakened conception of mathematical truth. Neither alternative seems ideal. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the philosophical writings of Henri Poincaré there is a coherent (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Habermas's moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge.James Gordon Finlayson - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319–344.
  • Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.
    This essay explains for a general philosophical audience the central issues and strategies in the contemporary moral realism debate. It critically surveys the contribution of some recent scholarship, representing expressivist and pragmatist nondescriptivism, subjectivist and nonsubjectivist naturalism, nonnaturalism and error theory. Four different faces of ‘ moral realism ’ are distinguished: semantic, ontological, metaphysical, and normative. The debate is presented as taking shape under dialectical pressure from the demands of capturing the moral appearances and reconciling morality with our understanding of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Sport and the View From Nowhere.Randolph Feezell - 2001 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (1):1-17.
  • The untruth in relativism.Christopher A. Dustin - 1995 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):17 – 53.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Evolutionary debunking of morality: epistemological or metaphysical?Ramon Das - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):417-435.
    It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Moral facts as configuring causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open Questions.Andrew Cullison - 2008 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.
    Millianism is a thesis in philosophy of language that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. Millianism faces certain puzzles called Frege's Puzzles. Some Millians defend the view by appealing to a metaphysics of belief that involves Ways of Believing. In the first part of this paper, I argue that ethical naturalists can adopt this Millian strategy to resist Moore’s Open Question argument. While this strategy of responding to the Open Question Argument has already appeared in the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Varieties of Moral Naturalism.David Copp - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Perceiver's Share: Realism, Scepticism, and Response Dependence.Christopher Norris - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):387-424.
    Response‐dispositional (RD) properties are standardly defined as those that involve an object's appearing thus or thus to some perceptually well‐equipped observer under specified epistemic conditions. The paradigm instance is that of colour or other such Lockean “secondary qualities”, as distinct from those—like shape and size—that pertain to the object itself, quite apart from anyone's perception. This idea has lately been thought to offer a promising alternative to the deadlocked dispute between hard‐line ‘metaphysical’ realists and subjectivists, projectivists, social constructivists, or hard‐line (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:107-128.
    Together, these entail that for every true proposition p, there exists some thing which could not exist and p be false.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Or we can be philosophers: a response to Barbara Forrest.Francis J. Beckwith - 2015 - Synthese 192 (Suppl 1):3-25.
    This article is a response to Barbara Forrest’ 2011 Synthese article, “On the Non-Epistemology of Intelligent Design.” Forrest offers an account of my philosophical work that consists almost entirely of personal attacks, excursions into my religious pilgrimage, and misunderstandings and misrepresentations of my work as well as of certain philosophical issues. Not surprisingly, the Synthese editors include a disclaimer in the front matter of the special issue in which Forrest’s article was published. In my response, I address three topics: (1) (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Entre Cila e Caríbdis: o dilema darwiniano e o debunking da moralidade.Evandro Barbosa - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gibbard's evolutionary theory of rationality and its ethical implications.Stephen W. Ball - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (2):129-180.
    Gibbard''s theory of rationality is evolutionary in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is rational are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard''s theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Normative Stance.Marcus Arvan - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (1):79-89.
    The Duhem-Quine thesis famously holds that a single hypothesis cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed in isolation, but instead only in conjunction with other background hypotheses. This article argues that this has important and underappreciated implications for metaethics. Section 1 argues that if one begins metaethics firmly wedded to a naturalistic worldview—due (e.g.) to methodological/epistemic considerations—then normativity will appear to be reducible to a set of social-psycho-semantic behaviors that I call the ‘normative stance.’ Contra Hume and Bedke (2012), I argue that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals.Fritz Allhoff - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97-114.
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation