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  1. Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 173-187.
    This paper disputes the widespread assumption that beliefs and desires may be attributed as theoretical entities in the service of the explanation and predic- tion of human behavior. The literature contains no clear account of how beliefs and desires might generate actions, and there is good reason to deny that principles of rationality generate a choice on the basis of an agent’s beliefs and desires. An alter- native conception of beliefs and desires is here introduced, according to which an attribution (...)
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  • Hinter das Bewusstsein zurück: Implizites Wissen als Ansatzpunkt der Sozialontologie.Stephan Zimmermann - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (6):848-866.
    The state of recent as well as older research on social ontology suggests a paradigmatic approach, according to which it is our consciousness that must provide the framework for conceptualising the social. I, however, argue that Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following opens up a new horizon for the ontology of the social. The fact that the rules of our language are social in nature and that we need not be aware of them in order to follow them shifts the problem to (...)
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  • Plural Action.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
    In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...)
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  • Collective Intentionality and the State Theory of Money.Georgios Papadopoulos - 2015 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):1.
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  • The Ontology of Money: Institutions, Power and Collective Intentionality.Georgios Papadopoulos - 2015 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8 (1):136.
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  • What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2017 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peters (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.
    This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and thus (...)
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  • Pluralities Without Reified Wholes: A Phenomenological Response to Hans Berhard Schmid's Collectivism.Eric Chelstrom - 2011 - Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: Serie Monográfica 3:87-106.
  • Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):467-493.
  • Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):467–493.
    The aim of the present paper is to evaluate the notion of collective guilt feeling both in the light of research in affectivity and in collective intentionality. The paper is divided into an introduction and three main sections. Section 1) highlights relevant features of guilt‐family emotions such as the relation between feeling guilt and objective guilt, the relation between feeling guilt and its content, and the relation between feeling guilt and the ‘self’. Moreover, the distinction between feeling guilt and feeling (...)
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