In this article I argue that the fundamental axiological claim of the New Natural Law Theory, according to which human life has an intrinsically valuable, cannot be defended within the framework assumed by the New Natural Law Theory itself, and further, that such a claim turns out to be false relative to a wider eudaimonistic framework that the Natural Law theorist is committed to accept. I do this this by adopting a dialectical standpoint which excludes any assumptions that could be (...) de-nied by the New Natural Law theorist, except for the axiological claim, and show that the New Natural Law theorist cannot argue for the axiological claim’s plausibility, and moreover, that in such a setting the New Natural Law theorist is compelled to replace the axiological claim by the claim that human life is instrumentally valuable. (shrink)

Heidegger, like Kierkegaard, has recently been claimed as a narrativist about selves. From this Heideggerian perspective, we can see how narrative expands upon the psychological view, adding a vital teleological dimension to the understanding of selfhood while denying the reductionism implicit in the psychological approach. Yet the narrative approach also inherits the neo-Lockean emphasis on the past as determining identity, whereas the self is fundamentally about the future. Death is crucial on this picture, not as allowing for the possibility of (...) a final meaning to our lives, but as determining Dasein as ‘pure unactualizable possibility.’ Ultimately, therefore, narrative is not what constitutes selfhood – but this does not mean that narrative is not relevant to personal identity, because narrative allows identity to be expressed in action. (shrink)

Can we render death harmless to us by perfecting life, as the ancient Epicureans and Stoics seemed to think? It might seem so, for after we perfect life—assuming we can—persisting would not make life any better. Dying earlier rather than later would shorten life, but a longer perfect life is no better than a shorter perfect life, so dying would take nothing of value from us. However, after sketching what perfecting life might entail, I will argue that it is not (...) a desirable approach to invulnerability after all. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the fundamental axiological claim of the New Natural Law Theory, according to which human life has an intrinsically valuable, cannot be defended within the framework assumed by the New Natural Law Theory itself, and further, that such a claim turns out to be false relative to a wider eudaimonistic framework that the Natural Law theorist is committed to accept. I do this this by adopting a dialectical standpoint which excludes any assumptions that could be (...) denied by the New Natural Law theorist, except for the axiological claim, and show that the New Natural Law theorist cannot argue for the axiological claim's plausibility, and moreover, that in such a setting the New Natural Law theorist is compelled to replace the axiological claim by the claim that human life is instrumentally valuable. La afirmación axiológica fundamental de la Nueva Ley Natural según la cual la vida humana tiene un valor intrínseco, no puede ser defendida dentro del marco teórico asumido por dicha teoría, y resulta ser falsa en un marco eudemonista más amplio, que debe ser aceptado por el teórico de la ley natural. Se asume una posición dialéctica que excluye cualquier suposición que pueda ser negada por el teórico de la NLN, con excepción de la afirmación axiológica, y se demuestra que él no puede mostrar la plausibilidad de la afirmación axiológica; más aún, que se ve forzado a reemplazar la afirmación axiológica por la aceptación de que la vida humana tiene un valor instrumental. (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of death as a philosophical and counter-hegemonic subject ‘erased’ from the imperialist cartography of knowledge. It revolves around three main points: the ‘loss’ of death from the imperialist epistemology of the global North, its subservient position towards the dominance of life in biopolitical discourses, and the instrumentality of death under the ongoing matrix of colonial/capitalist power. The paper challenges the hegemonic rationality of biopolitical discourses while proposing counter-hegemonic alternatives: they are hereby mainly situated in the (...) critique of sovereignty exemplified by Achille Mbembe’s groundbreaking work on the politics of death. In what serves as an attempt to avert our gaze from the dominant viewpoint of epistemic imperialism, the paper invites us to ‘unlearn’ what we are supposed to be proud of. As a way to engage in the decolonizing processes, it pleads for self-liberation from the forms of knowledge that, in their claim to be ‘universal’, continue to pertain to the imperialist reason and its hegemonic matrix of power. (shrink)