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Samuel Scheffler (2013). Death and the Afterlife.

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  1. Should I Choose to Never Die? Williams, Boredom, and the Significance of Mortality.David Beglin - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2009-2028.
    Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that we should choose to relinquish our (...)
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    Review: Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife New York, Oxford University Press USA 2013, ISBN: 978-0-19-998250-9 224 Pp. € 26, 66. [REVIEW]Frits Gåvertsson - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):1053-1056.
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    Existential Terror.Ben Bradley - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):409-418.
    Many of us feel existential terror when contemplating our future nonexistence. I examine several attempts to rationally justify existential terror. The most promising of these appeals to the effects of future nonexistence on the meaningfulness of our lives. I argue that even this justification fails, and therefore existential terror is irrational.
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    When the Shape of a Life Matters.Stephen M. Campbell - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3): 565-75.
    It seems better to have a life that begins poorly and ends well than a life that begins well and ends poorly. One possible explanation is that the very shape of a life can be good or bad for us. If so, this raises a tough question: when can the shape of our lives be good or bad for us? In this essay, I present and critique an argument that the shape of a life is a non-synchronic prudential value—that is, (...)
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  5.  19
    Time, Value, and Collective Immortality.Michael Cholbi - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (2):197-211.
    Samuel Scheffler has recently defended what he calls the ‘afterlife conjecture’, the claim that many of our evaluative attitudes and practices rest on the assumption that human beings will continue to exist after we die. Scheffler contends that our endorsement of this claim reveals that our evaluative orientation has four features: non-experientialism, non-consequentialism, ‘conservatism,’ and future orientation. Here I argue that the connection between the afterlife conjecture and these four features is not as tight as Scheffler seems to suppose. In (...)
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  6. Agency, Scarcity, and Mortality.Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):349-378.
    It is often argued, most recently by Samuel Scheffler, that we should reconcile with our mortality as constitutive of our existence: as essential to its temporal structure, to the nature of deliberation, and to our basic motivations and values. Against this reconciliatory strategy, I argue that there is a kind of immortal existence that is coherently conceivable and potentially desirable. First, I argue against the claim that our existence has a temporal structure with a trajectory that necessarily culminates in an (...)
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    Introduction.John Martin Fischer & Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):231-235.
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    The Ethics of Human Life Extension: The Second Argument From Evolution.Chris Gyngell - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):696-713.
    One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this article, I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species, this (...)
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  9.  31
    The Importance of a Good Ending: Some Reflections on Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife.Jens Johansson - 2015 - Journal of Ethics 19 (2):185-195.
    In his recent book, Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that it matters greatly to us that there be other human beings long after our own deaths. In support of this “Afterlife Thesis,” as I call it, he provides a thought experiment—the “doomsday scenario”—in which we learn that, although we ourselves will live a normal life span, 30 days after our death the earth will be completely destroyed. In this paper I question this “doomsday scenario” support for Scheffler’s Afterlife (...)
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  10.  17
    Death as a Social Harm.Lori Gruen - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):53-65.
    Lately there has been increased attention to the philosophical issues that death raises, but the focus remains individualistic. Death is philosophically puzzling. Death is thought to be bad for the individual who dies, but there is no one there to experience death as a harm. In this paper I argue that the harm of death is a social harm. Of course, social relationships are fundamentally changed when any member of a social group dies. Death is harmful for those left behind. (...)
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