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  1. Why animals are not robots.Theresa S. S. Schilhab - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):599-611.
    In disciplines traditionally studying expertise such as sociology, philosophy, and pedagogy, discussions of demarcation criteria typically centre on how and why human expertise differs from the expertise of artificial expert systems. Therefore, the demarcation criteria has been drawn between robots as formalized logical architectures and humans as creative, social subjects, creating a bipartite division that leaves out animals. However, by downsizing the discussion of animal cognition and implicitly intuiting assimilation of living organisms to robots, key features to explain why human (...)
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  • Words as cultivators of others minds.Theresa S. S. Schilhab - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  • Embodied cognition and science criticism: juxtaposing the early Nietzsche and Ingold’s anthropology.Theresa Schilhab - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (3):469-476.
    Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy introduces an intriguing combination of so-called ‘drives’, seemingly biologically inspired forces behind humanity’s cultural ways of relating to what is, and extensive distrust of science. Despite the Greek mythological context, the insight and the arguments provided by Nietzsche seem relevant to contemporary biologically inspired approaches to cognition found within biosemiotics, as well as the embodied cognition paradigm. Here, I discuss how Nietzsche’s biological conception of our relation to what is, incessantly emphasises a critical approach to (...)
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  • An enactivist account of abstract words: lessons from Merleau-Ponty.Brian A. Irwin - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):133-153.
    Enactivist accounts of language use generally treat concrete words in terms of motor intentionality systems and affordances for action. There is less consensus, though, regarding how abstract words are to be understood in enactivist terms. I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy to argue, against the representationalist paradigm that has dominated the cognitive scientific and philosophical traditions, that language is fundamentally a mode of participation in our world. In particular, language orients us within our milieus in a manner that extends into (...)
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