- Moral rationalism and rational amoralism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):495–525.details
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Pluralism About Practical Reasons and Reason Explanations.Eva Schmidt & Hans-Johann Glock - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations (2):1-18.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York: Routledge.details
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Possessing epistemic reasons: the role of rational capacities.Eva Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):483-501.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Moral perception, inference, and intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended.Daniel Weltman - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (64):1715-43.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.details
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Moral normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.details
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On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.details
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Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition.Hamid Vahid - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes.Anthony Taylor - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):97-113.details
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Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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The Social Construction of Incompetency: Moving Beyond Embedded Paternalism Toward the Practice of Respect.Supriya Subramani - 2020 - Health Care Analysis 28 (3):249-265.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
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A Better Disjunctivist Response to the 'New Evil Genius' Challenge.Kegan J. Shaw - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):101-125.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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Common Ground Between Social Ontology, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Ethics.Jared Oliphint - 2023 - Journal of Social Ontology 9 (1).details
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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Précis of The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):452-456.details
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Having reasons and the factoring account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.details
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Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Grounding the Domains of Reasons.Stephanie Leary - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):137-152.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating.Stan Husi - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449.details
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Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):439-457.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Normative Reasons Contextualism.Tim Henning - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.details
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Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.details
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