This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...) connection between these two views is more tentative than often supposed: philosophical narrativists that see life as a single unit of value and meaning nonetheless provide grounds for arguing that the end of life is not the best and may be a particularly bad time to approach and intervene in the matter of how well one's life as a whole has gone. (shrink)

This essay argues that the overuse of the idiom of forgiveness has distorted our understanding of the nature and requirements of political reconciliation, and proposes its supplementation by a notion of grace. This is a mode of response to wrongs that is less hedged around by conventions and conditions, and grace complements forgiveness in contexts in which the latter is inappropriate; it is also more serviceable for maintaining inter-community harmony in the long term. Following a detailed analysis of grace in (...) the political environment, the paper concludes by tracing a concept of grace in the Sermon on the Mount. (shrink)

In this article I explore how Cicely Saunders championed the hospice movement and initiated what became palliative care by representing her emotional connections with others. She became friends with dying patients and encouraged others to follow her example in listening to patients’ descriptions of pain. Her approach was radical at a time when she believed doctors routinely ‘deserted’ dying patients because it urged them to understand another’s embodied pain as inextricably bound up with the emotional impact of a terminal diagnosis. (...) Saunders’ attention to how patients expressed their experience is summed up in her term ‘total pain’, which communicates how an individual’s pain is a whole overwhelming experience, not only physical but also emotional, social and spiritual. Previous research frames ‘total pain’ in terms of narrative, emphasising Saunders’ focus on listening to her patients and her use of narratives as evidence in advocating for cultural and institutional change, both of which I understand as engaging with a patient’s emotional reality. However, as Saunders’ ideals become mainstreamed as palliative care and amid calls for ‘narrative palliative care’, I use evidence from Saunders’ extensive written output alongside archival material to suggest that, just as palliative care is by its nature not a single specific intervention, ‘total pain’ should not be understood as simply narrative. Building on existing work in this journal questioning the primacy of conventional understandings of narrative in the medical humanities, I demonstrate how Saunders’ prominent use of fragments and soundbites alongside longer case narratives demonstrates the limits of narrative, particularly when someone is dying. Saunders thus offers a case study for considering the implications that questioning the primacy of narrative as emotional evidence might have for our understandings of how empathy or advocacy can function, or be cultivated, in medical settings. (shrink)