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On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience

In Henry L. I. Roediger & Fergus I. M. Craik (eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness (1989)

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  1. A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
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  • Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  • The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
    It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue (...)
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  • The Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience: An Experimental Framework.Chris Frith, Richard Perry & Erik Lumer - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):105-114.
  • How Can Human Beings Transgress Their Biologically Based Views?Michael Vlerick - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):707-735.
    Empirical evidence from developmental psychology and anthropology points out that the human mind is predisposed to conceptualize the world in particular, species-specific ways. These cognitive predispositions lead to universal human commonsense views, often referred to as folk theories. Nevertheless, humans can transgress these views – i.e. they can contradict them with alternative descriptions, they perceive as more accurate – as exemplified in modern sciences. In this paper, I enquire about the cognitive faculties underlying such transgressions. I claim that there are (...)
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  • Consciousness: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape.Anthony P. Atkinson, Michael S. C. Thomas & Axel Cleeremans - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.
    What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the (...)
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  • A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Richard Brown & Joseph LeDoux - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
    Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a (...)
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  • What's New Here?Bruce Mangan - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):160-161.
    O'Brien & Opie's (O&O's) theory demands a view of unconscious processing that is incompatible with virtually all current PDP models of neural activity. Relative to the alternatives, the theory is closer to an AI than a parallel distributed processing (PDP) perspective, and its treatment of phenomenology is ad hoc. It raises at least one important question: Could features of network relaxation be the “switch” that turns an unconscious into a conscious network?
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  • How Similar Are Fluid Cognition and General Intelligence? A Developmental Neuroscience Perspective on Fluid Cognition as an Aspect of Human Cognitive Ability.Blair Clancy - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):109-125.
    This target article considers the relation of fluid cognitive functioning to general intelligence. A neurobiological model differentiating working memory/executive function cognitive processes of the prefrontal cortex from aspects of psychometrically defined general intelligence is presented. Work examining the rise in mean intelligence-test performance between normative cohorts, the neuropsychology and neuroscience of cognitive function in typically and atypically developing human populations, and stress, brain development, and corticolimbic connectivity in human and nonhuman animal models is reviewed and found to provide evidence of (...)
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  • Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective.Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez - 2002 - In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.
    While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current (...)
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  • The Intricate Relationships Between Monitoring and Control in Metacognition: Lessons for the Cause-and-Effect Relation Between Subjective Experience and Behavior.Asher Koriat, Hilit Ma'ayan & Ravit Nussinson - 2006 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (1):36-69.
  • Doing Without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
    We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to \ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact \ is a way for them to \. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to \ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to \, then an agent cannot both know (...)
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  • Is Implicit Learning About Consciousness?Richard A. Carlson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):400-400.
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  • Implicit Practical Learning.Elizabeth Ennen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):404-405.
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  • Awareness and Abstraction Are Graded Dimensions.Axel Cleeremans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):402-403.
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  • Are Subliminal Mere Exposure Effects a Form of Implicit Learning?Robert F. Bornstein - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):398-399.
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  • Learning Strategies and Situated Knowledge.Antonio Rizzo & Oronzo Parlangeli - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):420-421.
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  • Implicit Assumptions About Implicit Learning.Keith J. Holyoak & Merideth Gattis - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):406-407.
  • A Step Too Far?Dianne C. Berry - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):397-398.
  • How Should Implicit Learning Be Characterized?David R. Shanks & Mark F. St John - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):427-447.
  • Characteristics of Dissociable Human Learning Systems.David R. Shanks & Mark F. St John - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):367-447.
    A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal, namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances (or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning. We examine the evidence for implicit learning (...)
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  • Consciousness, Self‐Consciousness and Episodic Memory.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.
    My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self-consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self-consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer to (2) (...)
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  • The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control.Asher Koriat - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.
    The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once (...)
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  • What About the Unconscious?Chris Mortensen - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):162-162.
    O'Brien & Opie do not address the question of the psychotherapeutic role of unconscious representational states such as beliefs. A dilemma is proposed: if they accept the legitimacy of such states then they should modify what they say about dissociation, and if they do not, they owe us an account of why.
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  • Recognizing One's Own Face.Tilo T. J. Kircher, Carl Senior, Mary L. Phillips, Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, Philip J. Benson, Edward T. Bullmore, Mick Brammer, Andrew Simmons, Mathias Bartels & Anthony S. David - 2001 - Cognition 78 (1):B1-B15.
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  • What Is Consciousness?: Review of The Science of Consciousness by Max Velmans. [REVIEW]Patrice Terrier - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
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  • Constructing the Relational Mind.John G. Taylor - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    The "relational mind" approach to the inner content of consciousness is developed in terms of various control structures and processing strategies and their possible neurobiological identifications in brain sites. This leads naturally to a division of consciousness into a passive and an active part. A global control structure for the "single strand" aspect of consciousness is proposed as the thalamo-nucleus reticularis thalami-cortex coupled system, which is related to experimental data on the electrical stimulation of awareness. Local control, in terms of (...)
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  • Five Enigmas Regarding LaBerge's Triangular-Circuit Theory of Attention and Self-Referential Theory of Awareness.Nelson Cowan - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    COMMENTARY ON: LaBerge, D. "Attention, Awareness, and the Triangular Circuit". Consciousness and Cognition, 6, 149-181.
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  • Consciousness, Coordination, and Two Visual Streams.Peter Mcgeorge - 1999 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5.
    Milner and Goodale's influential theory of visual processing suggests that only the ventral stream is directly associated with explicit conscious experience. However the implicit/explicit distinction does not map clearly onto the two visual streams. Whilst there is good evidence for the non-conscious nature of dorsal stream processing, evidence suggests that substantial processing in the ventral stream also occurs in the absence of conscious awareness. An alternative view is considered in which it is assumed that conscious awareness is not a property (...)
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  • Tacit and Accessible Understanding of Language.Kent Johnson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):253 - 279.
    The empirical nature of our understanding of language is explored. I first show that there are several important and different distinctions between tacit and accessible awareness. I then present empirical evidence concerning our understanding of language. The data suggests that our awareness of sentence-meanings is sometimes merely tacit according to one of these distinctions, but is accessible according to another. I present and defend an interpretation of this mixed view. The present project is shown to impact on several diverse areas, (...)
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  • Anosognosia in Alzheimer’s Disease – The Petrified Self.Daniel C. Mograbi, Richard G. Brown & Robin G. Morris - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):989-1003.
    This paper reviews the literature concerning the neural correlates of the self, the relationship between self and memory and the profile of memory impairments in Alzheimer’s disease and explores the relationship between the preservation of the self and anosognosia in this condition. It concludes that a potential explanation for anosognosia in AD is a lack of updating of personal information due to the memory impairments characteristic of this disease. We put forward the hypothesis that anosognosia is due in part to (...)
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