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Samuel Scheffler (2004). Projects, Relationships, and Reasons.

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  1.  42
    The Problem with Yuppie Ethics.Gabriel Iason - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-22.
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  2.  98
    Expressive Actions.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):272-292.
    Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...)
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  3.  77
    Making Sense of Actions Expressing Emotions.Monika Betzler - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):447–466.
    Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...)
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    Making Sense of Actions Expressing Emotions.Monika Betzler - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):447-466.
    Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...)
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  5. Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant Differences.Arto Laitinen - 2006 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (1):47-70.
    This essay defends a three-dimensional response-model theory of recognition of persons, and discusses the related phenomenon of recognition of reasons, values and principles. The theory is three-dimensional in endorsing recognition of the equality of persons and two kinds of relevant differences: merits and special relationships. It defends a ‘response-model’ which holds that adequacy of recognition of persons is a matter of adequate responsiveness to situation-specific reasons and requirements. This three-dimen- sional response-model is compared to Peter Jones’s view, which draws the (...)
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  6.  55
    Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW]Van Willigenburg Theo - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning (...)
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