Can a phenomenology of culture be at the same time a philosophy of culture? In other words, can a descriptive exploration of acts and objects of culture serve at the same time as a critical reflection on those acts and objects? Or does cultural critique imply a separate and additional task, that of a normative examination of the explored cultural phenomena? What would be the founding values of such an examination? How would it be established? Furthermore, what would be the (...) importance of recognizing the distinct nature of this task compared to the exploratory-descriptive one? How would the two tasks relate to one another? Finally, is a full-fledged philosophy of culture, i.e. a critical exploration of cultural phenomena, needed? And if yes, why? These are the questions addressed by this paper. Answers are sought in a close examination of the work of Ernst Cassirer which involved both a phenomenology of cultural forms as well as an attempt at their normative-critical evaluation. And yet his work was criticized by many for its lack of an ethical dimension, a critique endorsed by another phenomenologist of culture, Alfred Schutz, whose work itself was accused for being non-critical. Beginning with a presentation of these two phenomenologies of culture this paper examines closely the charges directed against Cassirer's comprehensive philosophy of culture, namely, its idealism and its a-moralism. Through this examination the paper aims to shed light on a number of issues pertaining to the questions formulated above. (shrink)

“de-extinction” refers to the process of resurrecting extinct species by genetic methods. This science-fiction-sounding idea is in fact already in early processes of scientific implementation. Although this recent “revival of the dead” raises deep ethical questions, the ethics of de-extinction has barely received philosophical treatment. Rather than seeking a verdict for or against de-extinction, this paper attempts an overview and some novel analyses of the main ethical considerations. Five dimensions of the ethics of de-extinction are explored: (a) the possible contribution (...) of de-extinction to promoting ecological values, (b) the deontological argument that we owe de-extinction to species we rendered extinct, (c) the question of “playing God” through de-extinction, (d) the utilitarian perspective, and (e) the role of aesthetic considerations in the ethics of de-extinction. A general feature arising from the paper’s discussion is that, due to de-extinction’s special character, it repeatedly tests the limits of our ethical notions. (shrink)

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a (...) priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted. (shrink)

اخلاق حرمت حیات – پروردۀ آلبرت شوایستر – حامی صورت‌های مختلف حیات اعم از بشری و غیربشری است و بر حفظ و حرمت به حیات تاکید دارد. از سوی دیگر آرتور شوپنهاور معتقد به انکار حیات و کناره‌گیری از آن است. این مقاله به ربط و نسبت بین اخلاق حرمت حیات و اندیشه‌های شوپنهاور می-پردازد. از سویی حرمت حیات مبتنی بر ارادۀ معطوف به حیات و تاکید بر تجربه‌های انضمامی و جزیی است که نشان از مشابهت با و تاثیرپذیری از (...) مبانی متافیزیکی و روشی شوپنهاور دارد. اما از سوی دیگر آلبرت شوایتسر، مبدع اخلاق حرمت حیات، با تفسیری پویا از مفاهیم شوپنهاوریِ «ارادۀ معطوف به حیات» و «کنارگیری»، و تاکید بر «ارادۀ معطوف به محبت»، برخلاف شوپنهاور راه به تایید حیات و تاکید بر حفظ و حرمت حیات می‌برد. انگیزه‌های خاص الهیاتی او در این میان قابل مشاهده‌اند. بنابراین این دو اندیشمند در مبادی اخلاقی و اخلاق هنجاری و نیز در ابتنای زندگی و عمل خود بر نظریه‌های‌شان کاملا متفاوتند. از سویی تاثیر مبادی مسیحی شوایتسر بر اخلاق حرمت حیات و از سوی دیگر تاثیر پیشینۀ روانی شوپنهاور بر بدبینی او به جهان و در نتیجه انکارش در باب حیات مشهود است. (shrink)