Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On the Epigenesis of Meaning in Robots and Organisms: Could a Humanoid Robot Develop a Human Umwelt?Tom Ziemke - 2002 - Sign Systems Studies 30 (1):101-110.
    This paper discusses recent research on humanoid robots and thought experiments addressing the question to what degree such robots could be expected to develop human-like cognition, if rather than being pre-programmed they were made to learn from the interaction with their physical and social environment like human infants. A question of particular interest, from both a semiotic and a cognitive scientific perspective, is whether or not such robots could develop an experiential Umwelt, i.e. could the sign processes they are involved (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Uncanny Advantage of Using Androids in Cognitive and Social Science Research.Karl F. MacDorman & Hiroshi Ishiguro - 2006 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 7 (3):297-337.
    The development of robots that closely resemble human beings can contribute to cognitive research. An android provides an experimental apparatus that has the potential to be controlled more precisely than any human actor. However, preliminary results indicate that only very humanlike devices can elicit the broad range of responses that people typically direct toward each other. Conversely, to build androids capable of emulating human behavior, it is necessary to investigate social activity in detail and to develop models of the cognitive (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Minds, Brains and Programs: An Information-Theoretic Approach.Reza Maleeh - 2015 - Mind and Matter 13 (1):71-103.
    Adopting the notion of “pragmatic information” as interpreted by Roederer and granted that understanding arises from genuine information processing, I show that Searle’s “Chinese Room Argument” in rejecting the thesis of Strong Artificial Intelligence and his responses to critics are sound and acceptable. The paper is a safe and secure translation of Searle’s argument into a language of information. According to the notion of information that I adopt, information and information processing are exclusive attributes of biological and artificial systems. However, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ?Words Lie in Our Way?Bruce J. MacLennan - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):421-37.
    The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Reaping the Whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds[REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.
    Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.
    Computation is interpretable symbol manipulation. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on the basis of rules operating only on theirshapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning. Even if one accepts the Church/Turing Thesis that computation is unique, universal and very near omnipotent, not everything is a computer, because not everything can be given a systematic interpretation; and certainly everything can''t be givenevery systematic interpretation. But even after computers and computation have been successfully distinguished (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind.Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald Perlis & Ned Block - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
    Direct download (19 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW]Ayse P. Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
  • Recensione di Alva Noë, Out of Our Heads. Why You Are Not Your Brain and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness, Hill and Wang, New York, 2009. [REVIEW]Pietro Salis - 2011 - Aphex 4:246-264.
    Ita La recensione presenta la prospettiva enattivista difesa da Alva Noë, e ne discute alcuni aspetti specifici. Il pensiero, la coscienza e la cognizione non sono pienamente comprensibili, secondo l’enattivismo di Noë, senza un’adeguata considerazione del ruolo ricoperto dal corpo e dall’ambiente. Sarebbe quindi sbagliato continuare a pensare che il cervello da solo sia responsabile dei processi cognitivi umani: il programma che ricerca i correlati neurali della coscienza sarebbe quindi destinato al fallimento dal principio, perché tralascia in partenza corpo e (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Computationalism.Eric Dietrich - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (2):135-154.
    This paper argues for a noncognitiveist computationalism in the philosophy of mind. It further argues that both humans and computers have intentionality, that is, their mental states are semantical -- they are about things in their worlds.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Can Robots Make Good Models of Biological Behaviour?Barbara Webb - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1033-1050.
    How should biological behaviour be modelled? A relatively new approach is to investigate problems in neuroethology by building physical robot models of biological sensorimotor systems. The explication and justification of this approach are here placed within a framework for describing and comparing models in the behavioural and biological sciences. First, simulation models – the representation of a hypothesis about a target system – are distinguished from several other relationships also termed “modelling” in discussions of scientific explanation. Seven dimensions on which (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Why and How We Are Not Zombies.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):164-67.
    A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Turing Test: The First Fifty Years.Robert French - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):115-121.
    The Turing Test, originally proposed as a simple operational definition of intelligence, has now been with us for exactly half a century. It is safe to say that no other single article in computer science, and few other articles in science in general, have generated so much discussion. The present article chronicles the comments and controversy surrounding Turing's classic article from its publication to the present. The changing perception of the Turing Test over the last fifty years has paralleled the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Benchmarks for Evaluating Socially Assistive Robotics.David Feil-Seifer, Kristine Skinner & Maja J. Mataric - 2007 - Interaction Studies 8 (3):423-439.
  • The Annotation Game: On Turing (1950) on Computing, Machinery, and Intelligence.Stevan Harnad - 2006 - In Robert Epstein & Grace Peters (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This quote/commented critique of Turing's classical paper suggests that Turing meant -- or should have meant -- the robotic version of the Turing Test (and not just the email version). Moreover, any dynamic system (that we design and understand) can be a candidate, not just a computational one. Turing also dismisses the other-minds problem and the mind/body problem too quickly. They are at the heart of both the problem he is addressing and the solution he is proposing.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Doing, Feeling, Meaning And Explaining.Stevan Harnad - unknown
    It is “easy” to explain doing, “hard” to explain feeling. Turing has set the agenda for the easy explanation (though it will be a long time coming). I will try to explain why and how explaining feeling will not only be hard, but impossible. Explaining meaning will prove almost as hard because meaning is a hybrid of know-how and what it feels like to know how.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Chinese Room Argument--Dead but Not yet Buried.Robert I. Damper - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
    This article is an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman’s review of Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument. Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong. Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it? One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, yet it has been very little (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intencionalidade: mecanismo e interacção.Porfírio Silva - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (2):255-278.
    In this essay we try an answer to the question has intentionality to be reduced to anything? We propose that it is possible to reduce any variety of intentionality to a specification of mechanisms (internal organization of the items involved in a given intentional phenomenon) and a historical pattern of interaction (structure of mutual significant relations historically acquired by different items involved in the same intentional phenomenon). We first clarify the meaning of this proposal having recourse to the Ruth Millikan’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Neural Networks and Psychopharmacology.Sbg Park - 1998 - In Dan J. Stein & J. Ludick (eds.), Neural Networks and Psychopathology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57.
  • The Logic of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
  • Computation and Intentionality: A Recipe for Epistemic Impasse.Itay Shani - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (2):207-228.
    Searle’s celebrated Chinese room thought experiment was devised as an attempted refutation of the view that appropriately programmed digital computers literally are the possessors of genuine mental states. A standard reply to Searle, known as the “robot reply” (which, I argue, reflects the dominant approach to the problem of content in contemporary philosophy of mind), consists of the claim that the problem he raises can be solved by supplementing the computational device with some “appropriate” environmental hookups. I argue that not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Simulating Convesations: The Communion Game. [REVIEW]Stephen J. Cowley & Karl MacDorman - 1995 - AI and Society 9 (2-3):116-137.
    In their enthusiasm for programming, computational linguists have tended to lose sight of what humansdo. They have conceived of conversations as independent of sound and the bodies that produce it. Thus, implicit in their simulations is the assumption that the text is the essence of talk. In fact, unlike electronic mail, conversations are acoustic events. During everyday talk, human understanding depends both on the words spoken and on fine interpersonal vocal coordination. When utterances are analysed into sequences of word-based forms, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture.Camilo J. Cela-Conde & Gisèle Marty - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340.
    The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Universal Intelligence: A Definition of Machine Intelligence.Shane Legg & Marcus Hutter - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (4):391-444.
    A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: we take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations