Citations of work:

Scott R. Sehon (1994). Teleology and the Nature of Mental States.

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  1.  3
    The Renaissance of the Anti-Causal Theory of Action.Suzuki Yudai - 2016 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 49 (2):5-25.
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  2.  71
    Desires, Dispositions and Deviant Causal Chains.John Hyman - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):83-112.
    Recent work on dispositions offers a new solution to the long-running dispute about whether explanations of intentional action are causal explanations. The dispute seemed intractable because of a lack of percipience about dispositions and a commitment to Humean orthodoxies about causation on both sides.
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  3.  50
    Individualism and the Metaphysics of Actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.
    I examine an intuitive property of folk-psychological explanations I call self-sufficiency. I argue that individualism cannot honor this property and work toward distilling an account of psychological explanation that does honor it, given some fairly standard assumptions. In doing so, my preference for an Externalist individuation of intentional state will emerge unambiguously. The assumptions I rely on are fairly standard but not uncontroversial. Yet not always do I attempt to defend them from objections. My goal is an account of folk (...)
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  4. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.
  5.  46
    Connectionism and the Causal Theory of Action Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):511-532.
    It is widely assumed that common sense psychological explanations of human action are a species of causal explanation. I argue against this construal, drawing on Ramsey et al.'s paper, “Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology”. I argue that if certain connec-tionist models are correct, then mental states cannot be identified with functionally discrete causes of behavior, and I respond to some recent attempts to deny this claim. However, I further contend that our common sense psychological practices are not (...)
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