Switch to: References

Citations of:

Dynamics and Cognition

Minds and Machines 23 (3):353-375 (2013)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Cognition in Practice: Conceptual Development and Disagreement in Cognitive Science.Mikio Akagi - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embodied Cognition and Sport.Lawrence Shapiro & Shannon Spaulding - forthcoming - In Massimiliano Cappuccio (ed.), Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology. MIT Press.
    Successful athletic performance requires precision in many respects. A batter stands behind home plate awaiting the arrival of a ball that is less than three inches in diameter and moving close to 100 mph. His goal is to hit it with a ba­­t that is also less than three inches in diameter. This impressive feat requires extraordinary temporal and spatial coordination. The sweet spot of the bat must be at the same place, at the same time, as the ball. A (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Amusement and Beyond.Steffen Steinert - 2017 - Dissertation, LMU München
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sensorimotor Grounding of Musical Embodiment and the Role of Prediction: A Review.Pieter-Jan Maes - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • “Cognition” and Dynamical Cognitive Science.Luis H. Favela & Jonathan Martin - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):331-355.
    Several philosophers have expressed concerns with some recent uses of the term ‘cognition’. Underlying a number of these concerns are claims that cognition is only located in the brain and that no compelling case has been made to use ‘cognition’ in any way other than as a cause of behavior that is representational in nature. These concerns center on two primary misapprehensions: First, that some adherents of dynamical cognitive science think DCS implies the thesis of extended cognition and the rejection (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rethinking the Problem of Cognition.Mikio Akagi - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3547-3570.
    The present century has seen renewed interest in characterizing cognition, the object of inquiry of the cognitive sciences. In this paper, I describe the problem of cognition—the absence of a positive characterization of cognition despite a felt need for one. It is widely recognized that the problem is motivated by decades of controversy among cognitive scientists over foundational questions, such as whether non-neural parts of the body or environment can realize cognitive processes, or whether plants and microbes have cognitive processes. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):277-286.
  • Cognition and Behavior.Ken Aizawa - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4269-4288.
    An important question in the debate over embodied, enactive, and extended cognition has been what has been meant by “cognition”. What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied, enactive, or extended? Rather than undertake a frontal assault on this question, however, this paper will take a different approach. In particular, we may ask how cognition is supposed to be related to behavior. First, we could ask whether cognition is supposed to be behavior. Second, we could ask whether we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied?Ken Aizawa - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1).
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations