Citations of work:

Lawrence A. Shapiro (1992). Darwin and Disjunction: Foraging Theory and Univocal Assignments of Content.

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  1.  64
    On Several Misuses of Sober’s Selection for/Selection of Distinction.Marc Artiga - 2011 - Topoi 30 (2):181-193.
    Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality. However, it is widely known that these theories suffer from a major objection: the Indeterminacy Problem. The most common reply to this problem employs the Target of Selection Argument, which is based on Sober’s distinction between selection for and selection of . Unfortunately, some years ago the Target of Selection Argument came into serious attack in a famous paper by Goode and Griffiths. Since then, the question (...)
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  2.  22
    Comparative Cognitive Studies, Not Folk Phylogeny, Please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122.
  3.  5
    Can Children with Autism Integrate First and Third Person Representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123.
  4.  35
    Intentional Relations and Social Understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107.
  5.  17
    Understanding Self and Other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142.
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  6.  5
    Language and its Role in Understanding Intentional Relations: Research Tool or Mechanism of Development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125.
  7.  7
    An Ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126.
  8.  3
    On the Dangers of Oversimulation.Gergely Csibra & György Gergely - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):127.
  9.  22
    Moral Competence is Cognitive but Nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128.
  10.  3
    Rhesus Monkeys Are Radical Behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129.
  11.  8
    Second Person Intentional Relations and the Evolution of Social Understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129.
  12.  11
    First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130.
  13.  6
    Imagination and Imitation: Input, Acid Test, or Alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131.
  14.  4
    Understanding Minds and Selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132.
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  15.  3
    Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Other Minds, and Kinesthetic-Visual Matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133.
  16.  3
    But What is the Intentional Schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133.
    The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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  17.  7
    Four-Year-Old Humans Are Different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134.
  18.  5
    Understanding That Looking Causes Knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135.
  19.  4
    Social Relations and Understanding the Intentional Self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136.
  20.  8
    Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137.
  21.  1
    Intentional Schema Will Not Do the Work of a Theory of Mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138.
  22.  15
    Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140.
  23.  1
    Are Blind Babies Delayed in Achieving Social Understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141.
  24.  7
    Development of Social Emotions and Constructive Agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124.
  25.  76
    The Misuse of Sober's Selection for/Selection of Distinction.R. Goode & P. E. Griffiths - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (1):99-108.
    Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that selection (...)
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