Many efforts to establish concepts and theories of the middle range have sought to find an appropriate balance between theoretical abstraction and the desire to remain faithful to the empirical complexity of phenomenon. As with other forms of expertise, those analyzing socio-technical life face acute tensions in attempting to reconcile the general and the specific in a manner which is regarded as credible. Through a consideration of the self-referential implications of STS critiques of traditional notions of science as well as (...) attempts to establish rules for the acceptability of coercive force, this article develops a sense of what is at stake in attempts by actors and analysts to grasp the general and the specific together. Instead of seeking to identify a point of resolution for the two, it advocates and exemplifies the need to attend to the dilemmas associated with the movement between the general and the specific. The middle range concept of “disposal strategies” is offered both as an aid to the study of socio-technical life and as an example of attending to the movement between the general and specific. (shrink)

There are realist philosophers and social scientists who believe in the indispensability of social ontology. However, we argue that certain pragmatist outlines for inquiry open more fruitful roads to empirical research than such ontologizing perspectives. The pragmatist conceptual tools in a Darwinian vein—concepts like action, habit, coping and community—are in a particularly stark contrast with, for instance, the Searlean and Chomskian metaphysics of human being. In particular, we bring Searle's realist philosophy of society and mind under critical survey in this (...) paper and contrast it with a pragmatist, sociologizing approach. Drawing from Dewey, James, and recent antirepresentationalism, we propose for research work a methodological relationalism of its own kind, altogether detached from the ontologies of society and mind. (shrink)

Taking its orientation from Peter Winch, this article critiques from a Wittgensteinian point of view some “theoreticist” tendencies within constructivism. At the heart of constructivism is the deeply Wittgensteinian idea that the world as we know and understand it is the product of human intelligence and interests. The usefulness of this idea can be vitiated by a failure to distinguish conceptual from empirical questions. I argue that such a failure characterises two influential constructivist theories, those of Ernst von Glasersfeld and (...) David Bloor. These are considered in turn. Both theories seek to give a general, causal account of knowledge: von Glasersfeld's in term of cognitive subjectivity, Bloor's in terms of social agreement. Ironically, given that both writers cite Wittgenstein as a source of theoretical inspiration, assumptions of both theories run counter to key Wittgensteinian arguments. To show that Wittgenstein's views offer no solace to the realist, the article closes with a brief consideration of John Searle's theory of knowledge. (shrink)

This article examines the learning of a scientific procedure, and its connection to the greater scientific community through the notion of Wittgensteinian rules. The analysis reveals this connection by demonstrating that learning in interaction is largely grounded in rule-based community descriptions and judgments rather than any inner process. This same analysis also demonstrates that learning processes are particularly suited for such an analysis because rules and concomitant phenomena comprise a significant portion of any learning interaction. This analysis further reveals the (...) elucidating merit of Wittgensteinian rules, their relation to community and the concept of practice, and promotes the efficacy of participant-generated rule-formulations as analytic descriptors. (shrink)

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

This chapter considers Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly as elaborated in Philosophical Investigations and later works, as it has obtained relevance in science education research. The specific focus is on contributions related to students’ learning of science. Wittgenstein’s writings have been used in science education in several ways: to argue for an alternate conception of rationality in theories of learning science, to support theories examining the discursive and social nature of learning, to advocate for investigations of science classrooms that parallel ethnographic and (...) sociological investigations of professional science labs, and to develop alternative research methodologies. An examination of this influence in science education necessitates discussion of the frequent implicit attempts made to reconcile Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy with empirical habits firmly grounded in a cognitivist tradition. Particular attention is given to the way in which a typical focus in science education on students’ “meaning making” is likely at odds with Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is argued that the exemplars provided in his later work suggest that conceptual clarity is necessary for coherence in asking empirical questions and interpreting results and that they imply an alternative, descriptive orientation for researchers. (shrink)