Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Are connectionist models cognitive?Benny Shanon - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
    In their critique of connectionist models Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) dismiss such models as not being cognitive or psychological. Evaluating Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique requires examining what is required in characterizating models as 'cognitive'. The present discussion examines the various senses of this term. It argues the answer to the title question seems to vary with these different senses. Indeed, by one sense of the term, neither representa-tionalism nor connectionism is cognitive. General ramifications of such an appraisal are discussed and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Organology and modularity: One piece of the mind or two?Helmut Hildebrandt - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):21-38.
    The conception of a modular structure of mind, which postulates that the mind is composed of more or less autonomous subsystems, is widespread in contemporary psychology. Proponents of a modular structure of the mind, such as Marshall (1980; 1984; 1985), Fodor (1983), Gardner (1983), and Shallice (1988), have linked their work to F. J. Gall's theory of organology or of the “functions of the brain”. This paper argues: (1) Gall's organology defends a view of the capacities of the mind that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•