Wilfrid Sellars is usually read as claiming that only the unobservable, theoretical objects which science would postulate at the ideal end of inquiry are real. Against this, Willem deVries has suggested that we can develop a notion of practical reality in the context of Sellars's philosophy which would pertain primarily to commonsense objects. I use deVries's suggestion as a foil to clarify Sellars's own commitments about the practical. I show that the notion of practical reality is not necessary to secure (...) the ultimate legitimacy of practical concepts. We can retreat to the less committed notion of practical truth. I argue that the notion of practical truth may not be sufficient to ensure that ultimately legitimate practical concepts are commonsense concepts in Sellars's framework. Nevertheless, deVries's suggestion highlights that Sellars's vision of an ultimate conceptual system may have been richer than is often thought. (shrink)