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  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • Impact of Teacher's Mental State Talk on Young Children's Theory of Mind: A Quasi-Experiment Study.Jianfen Wu, Minmin Liu & Wenqi Lin - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    This study investigated the relationship between teachers' mental state talk and young children's theory of mind with a quasi-experiment. In total, 56 young children were assigned to the experiment group and the control group. The experiment group was engaged in a 12-week intervention program with mental state talk in storytelling, casual conversations, and role-playing games, whereas the control group received no interventions. All the children were tested with three theory of mind tasks before and after the intervention. The results indicated (...)
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  • Common Sense, Functional Theories and Knowledge of the Mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential (...)
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  • Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):179-199.
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential (...)
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  • The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael J. Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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  • Perspective Taking and Belief Attribution : From Piaget's Theory to Children's Theory of Mind.Pierre Mounoud - unknown
    This paper analyzes the origins and specificity of the recent research trend on the development in children of a Theory of mind which has undergone an impressive expansion over past the fifteen years. A comparison with Piaget's approach is proposed regarding the experimental data available on the coordination of perspectives as well as the epistemological foundations. The issues of the naturalization of the mind and its irreducibility are addressed within the framework of recent reductionist theories advanced by the philosophers of (...)
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  • Theory of Mind Experience Sampling in Typical Adults.Lauren Bryant, Anna Coffey, Daniel J. Povinelli & John R. Pruett - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):697-707.
    We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought and degree of socializing at the time of inquiry. (...)
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  • Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.
  • How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
  • The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  • Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!Jean Baratgin, Marion Dubois-Sage, Baptiste Jacquet, Jean-Louis Stilgenbauer & Frank Jamet - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: “Maxi puts his chocolate (...)
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  • Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
    Language is a human universal reflecting our deeply social nature. Among its essential functions, language enables us to quickly and efficiently share information. We tell each other that many things are true—that is, we routinely make assertions. Information shared this way plays a critical role in the decisions and plans we make. In Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion, a distinguished philosopher and cognitive scientist investigates the rules or norms that structure our social practice of assertion. Combining evidence from philosophy, (...)
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  • Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):391-409.
    Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands (...)
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  • ‘I’M Not X, I Just Want Y’: Formulating ‘Wants’ in Interaction.Carrie Childs - 2012 - Discourse Studies 14 (2):181-196.
    This article provides a conversation analytic description of a two-part structure, ‘I don’t want X, I want/just want Y’. Drawing on a corpus of recordings of family mealtimes and television documentary data, I show how speakers use the structure in two recurrent environments. First, speakers may use the structure to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an interlocutor. Second, speakers may deliver the structure following a co-interactant’s formulation of their actions or motivations. Both uses decrease the likelihood of (...)
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  • The Construction of Self in Relationships: Narratives and References to Mental States During Picture-Book Reading Interactions Between Mothers and Children.Rollo Dolores, Longobardi Emiddia, Spataro Pietro & Sulla Francesco - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  • Individual Differences in Toddlers’ Social Understanding and Prosocial Behavior: Disposition or Socialization?Rebekkah L. Gross, Jesse Drummond, Emma Satlof-Bedrick, Whitney E. Waugh, Margarita Svetlova & Celia A. Brownell - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Children's Early Understanding of False Belief.Peter Mitchell & Hazel Lacohée - 1991 - Cognition 39 (2):107-127.
  • Semantic Information and the Syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs.Aaron S. White, Valentine Hacquard & Jeffrey Lidz - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (2):416-456.
    Propositional attitude verbs, such as think and want, have long held interest for both theoretical linguists and language acquisitionists because their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties display complex interactions that have proven difficult to fully capture from either perspective. This paper explores the granularity with which these verbs’ semantic and pragmatic properties are recoverable from their syntactic distributions, using three behavioral experiments aimed at explicitly quantifying the relationship between these two sets of properties. Experiment 1 gathers a measure of 30 (...)
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  • Analogical Comparison Promotes Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Christian Hoyos, William S. Horton, Nina K. Simms & Dedre Gentner - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (9).
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  • Is “Thinking” Belief? Reply to Wellman and Bartsch.Josef Perner - 1989 - Cognition 33 (3):315-319.
  • Knowledge for Hunger: Children's Problem with Representation in Imputing Mental States.Josef Perner & Jane E. Ogden - 1988 - Cognition 29 (1):47-61.
  • Behaviorism at Fifty.B. F. Skinner - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):615.
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  • Behaviorism at Seventy.Daniel N. Robinson - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):641-643.
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  • Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task.Evan Westra - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):235-257.
    Nativists about theory of mind have typically explained why children below the age of four fail the false belief task by appealing to the demands that these tasks place on children’s developing executive abilities. However, this appeal to executive functioning cannot explain a wide range of evidence showing that social and linguistic factors also affect when children pass this task. In this paper, I present a revised nativist proposal about theory of mind development that is able to accommodate these findings, (...)
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  • German Children's Productivity with Simple Transitive and Complement-Clause Constructions: Testing the Effects of Frequency and Variability.Silke Brandt, Arie Verhagen, Elena Lieven & Michael Tomasello - 2011 - Cognitive Linguistics 22 (2).
  • How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2013 - Philosophia (1):1-13.
    Recent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires (...)
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  • The Social Cover View: A Non-Epistemic Approach to Mindreading.Manuel Almagro Holgado & Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):483-505.
    Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an (...)
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  • Gettier Across Cultures.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui & Takaaki Hashimoto - 2015 - Noûs:645-664.
    In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.
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  • The Social Cover View: A Non-Epistemic Approach to Mindreading.Manuel Almagro Holgado & Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):483–505.
    Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an (...)
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  • Understanding Self and Other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • Are Blind Babies Delayed in Achieving Social Understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.
    Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
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  • Intentional Schema Will Not Do the Work of a Theory of Mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.
    Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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  • Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.
    Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.
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  • Social Relations and Understanding the Intentional Self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
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  • Four-Year-Old Humans Are Different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Understanding That Looking Causes Knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • Understanding Minds and Selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.
    Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source of domain-general information-processing capacities.
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  • Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Other Minds, and Kinesthetic-Visual Matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.
    The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
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  • Imagination and Imitation: Input, Acid Test, or Alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.
    Immediate imitation is likely to be a major, direct input to Barresi & Moore's level 2 competence, but deferred imitation is unlikely to play a key role in the transition to level 3, because the attribution of first person knowledge is neither a necessary cause nor an obvious consequence of deferred imitation, and deferred imitation does not correlate phylogenetically with capacities that more plausibly either yield or reflect a concept of intentional agency.
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  • First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
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  • Rhesus Monkeys Are Radical Behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.
    The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago. When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
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  • Second Person Intentional Relations and the Evolution of Social Understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.
    Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.
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  • Moral Competence is Cognitive but (Perhaps) Nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.
    Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
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  • On the Dangers of Oversimulation.Gergely Csibra & György Gergely - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):127-128.
    Barresi & Moore fail to provide a satisfactory account for the development of social understanding because of their ambiguous characterization of the relationship between the intentional schema and shared intentional activities, their underestimation of the representational capacities of infants, and their overreliance on the simulationist assumption that understanding others is tantamount to sharing their experience.
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  • An Ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126-127.
    The difference between first and third person information may be thought of as a difference in either informationalcontentor informationalmodality. Each option faces some problems. I try to sort out some of these issues and raise a question about the explanatory force of the notion of a schema.
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  • Language and its Role in Understanding Intentional Relations: Research Tool or Mechanism of Development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125-126.
    In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.
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  • Development of Social Emotions and Constructive Agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.
    The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore. Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.
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  • Can Children with Autism Integrate First and Third Person Representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information, and in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
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