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  1. Thinking of Oneself as the Same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  • The Embodied Self-Awareness of the Infant: A Challenge to the Theory-Theory of Mind.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...)
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  • From Brain to Cosmos (Preliminary Revised Edition).Mark Sharlow - manuscript
    This is a draft for a revised edition of Mark Sharlow's book "From Brain to Cosmos." It includes most of the material from the first edition, two shorter pieces pertaining to the book, and a detailed new introduction.
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  • Self-Love and Altruism.David O. Brink - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
    Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard (...)
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  • Art Identity.Nick Zangwill - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):335-.
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  • The Psychological Theory and Dead People.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):783.
  • Impartiality and Associative Duties.David O. Brink - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (2):152.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...)
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  • Identity, “Identology” and World Religions.Samy S. Swayd - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):30-43.
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  • Persons and Mysterianism.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):165-188.
    The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conceive (...)
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  • Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):61-75.
  • A Representation of Time Discounting.Conrad Heilmann - unknown
    The concept of time discounting introduces weights on future goods to make these less valu- able. Famously, both the specic functional form of time discounting and its normative sta- tus are contested. To address these problems, this paper provides a measurement-theoretic framework of representation for time discounting. The general representation theorem char- acterises time discounting factors as ratio-scale representations of dierences in temporally extended prospects. This framework of representation is used to reconsider interpretations of time discounting factors such as time (...)
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  • Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann - unknown
    We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent connectedness measures the extent to which agents' choices are sequentially stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide suffcient conditions (...)
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  • Self: Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2009 - In W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 301-312.
    Personal identity deals with the many philosophical questions about ourselves that arise by virtue of our being people. The most frequently discussed is what it takes for a person to persist through time. Many philosophers say that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity. Others say that our persistence is determined by brute physical facts, and psychology is irrelevant. In choosing among these answers we must consider not only what they imply about who is who in particular cases, both real (...)
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  • Ways of Understanding Hugh MacColl's Concept of Symbolic Existence.Shahid Rahman - 1998 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3:35-58.
  • Functionalism and Personal Identity.Nicholas Agar - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):52-70.
    Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory\nabout mental states, implies a certain theory about the\nidentity over time of persons, the entities that have\nmental states. He also claims that persons can survive a\n"Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these\nclaims includes description and analysis of imaginary\ncases, but--notably--not appeals to our "intuitions"\nconcerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic\ninsight is correct. But there is no implication that it is\nnecessary. (edited).
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  • Could God Become Man?Richard Swinburne - 1989 - Philosophy 25 (Supplement):53 - 70.
    Christian orthodoxy has maintained that in Jesus Christ God became man, i.e., acquired a human nature, while remaining God. Given two not unreasonable restrictions on the understanding of "man," that claim is perfectly coherent. But if the New Testament is correct in claiming that in some sense Christ was ignorant, weak, and temptable, we have to suppose that Christ had a divided mind; or, in traditional terminology, that the two natures did not totally interpenetrate.
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  • Fission May Kill You.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):565-582.
    If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non-identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non-identity. I also argue that the (...)
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  • Establishing Personal Identity in Reincarnation: Minds and Bodies Reconsidered.Claire White - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (3-4):402-429.
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  • Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):155-179.
    We argue that animalism is the only materialist account of personal identity that can account for the autonomy that we typically think of ourselves as possessing. All the rival materialist theories suffer from a moral version of the problem of too many thinkers when they posit a human person that overlaps a numerically distinct human animal. The different persistence conditions of overlapping thinkers will lead them to have interests that conflict, which in many cases prevents them both from autonomously forming (...)
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  • Is Blameworthiness Forever?Andrew C. Khoury & Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):204-224.
    Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from (...)
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  • Externalism and Conceptual Analysis.Christopher A. Vogel - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):730-765.
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  • Identity, Survival, and the Reasonableness of Replication.John E. Pogue - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):45-70.