Citations of work:

Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Phenomenal Character of Experience.

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  1.  19
    What Does the 'Transparency of Experience' Show About the Relationship Between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?Yasushi Ogusa - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (1):17-33.
  2. Perception and Representation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.
    I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I (...)
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  3.  72
    Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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