The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by (...) analyzing the issue of values with the help of a framework taken from the wider philosophical debate on science and values. Second, we study the principal conceptualizations used by scholars who have applied them to numerous case studies. Third, we appraise the links between those conceptualizations and learning processes in decision-oriented science. In this, we recur to the concept of methodological learning, i.e., learning about the best methodologies for generating knowledge that is useful for science-based regulatory decisions. The main result of our analysis is that non-cognitive values can contribute to methodological improvements in science in three principal ways: as basis for critical analysis, for contextualizing methodologies, and for establishing the burden of proof. (shrink)

Le débat sur le rôle des valeurs en science survient également dans les sciences appliquées, en particulier dans les sciences régulatives. Nous proposons une analyse, sous l’angle des valeurs, des controverses récentes sur le rôle de la connaissance scientifique dans la régulation des risques technologiques. Nous distinguons trois perspectives sur les valeurs cognitives et non-cognitives, dans le contexte de l’évaluation et de la gestion du risque. Notre analyse montre que les deux types de valeurs interagissent au sein du processus de (...) génération de connaissances dans les sciences régulatives, et que des propositions de changements méthodologiques dépendent de la reconnaissance explicite du rôle opérant des valeurs. Notre contribution indique que l’analyse philosophique des valeurs peut aider à clarifier les controverses actuelles sur les risques technologiques. (shrink)

Le débat sur le rôle des valeurs en science survient également dans les sciences appliquées, en particulier dans les sciences régulatives. Nous proposons une analyse, sous l’angle des valeurs, des controverses récentes sur le rôle de la connaissance scientifique dans la régulation des risques technologiques. Nous distinguons trois perspectives sur les valeurs cognitives et non-cognitives, dans le contexte de l’évaluation et de la gestion du risque. Notre analyse montre que les deux types de valeurs interagissent au sein du processus de (...) génération de connaissances dans les sciences régulatives, et que des propositions de changements méthodologiques dépendent de la reconnaissance explicite du rôle opérant des valeurs. Notre contribution indique que l’analyse philosophique des valeurs peut aider à clarifier les controverses actuelles sur les risques technologiques. (shrink)

The relevance of scientific knowledge for science and technology policy and regulation has led to a growing debate about the role of values. This article contributes to the clarification of what specific functions cognitive and noncognitive values adopt in knowledge generation and decisions, and what consequences the operation of values has for policy making and regulation. For our analysis, we differentiate between three different types of decision approaches, each of which shows a particular constellation of cognitive and noncognitive values. Our (...) objectives are to present a structured analysis of the varying functions that different kinds of values can adopt, as well as the value-related tensions and trade-offs they give rise to. We argue that the operation of noncognitive values in scientific knowledge generation, policy, and regulatory decision making can be understood as an enabling factor, rather than a limiting one. (shrink)

Mechanistic information is used in the field of risk assessment in order to clarify two controversial methodological issues, the selection of inference guides and the definition of standards of evidence. In this paper we present an analysis of the concept of mechanistic information in risk assessment by recurring to previous philosophical analyses of mechanistic explanation. Our conclusion is that the conceptual analysis of mechanistic explanation facilitates a better characterization of the concept of mechanistic information. However, it also shows that the (...) use of this kind of information in risk assessment is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors, which have not been sufficiently taken into account in philosophical analysis. Mechanistic models are like hypothesis that have to be validated empirically. Due to their dependence on the standards of evidence, they are subject to the same pragmatic factors. Therefore, recurring to mechanistic information does not lead to closure of the methodological controversies in risk assessment. (shrink)

The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.