Switch to: References

Citations of:

Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce

In A. Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press (2015)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.
    It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
  • How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):408-435.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   7 citations