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  1. Musical Change Deafness: The Inability to Detect Change in a Non-Speech Auditory Domain.Kat R. Agres & Carol L. Krumhansl - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 969--974.
  • Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision.D. van Eck - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.
  • Individual Differences in Change Blindness.Katharina Verena Bergmann - unknown
    The present work shows the existence of systematic individual differences in change blindness. It can be concluded that the sensitivity for changes is a trait. That is, persons differ in their ability to detect changes, independent from the situation or the measurement method. Moreover, there are two explanations for individual differences in change blindness: a) capacity differences in visual selective attention that may be influenced by top-down activated attention helping to focus attention onto relevant stimuli b) differences in working memory (...)
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  • Manufacturing Magic and Computational Creativity.Howard Williams & Peter W. McOwan - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Attentional Capture by Irrelevant Transients Leads to Perceptual Errors in a Competitive Change Detection Task.Daniel Schneider, Christian Beste & Edmund Wascher - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  • NOË, Alva. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness.Laura Machado do Nascimento - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3).
  • Doświadczenie I Eksperyment W Sztuce.Alva Noë - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1).
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
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  • The Allocation of Attention in Scene Perception.Melissa Vo - unknown
  • Segmentation, Attention and Phenomenal Visual Objects.Jon Driver, Greg Davis, Charlotte Russell, Massimo Turatto & Elliot Freeman - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):61-95.
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  • Experience and Experiment in Art.Alva Noë - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
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  • Attentional Capture and Inattentional Blindness.Daniel J. Simons - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.
  • Evidence for Preserved Representations in Change Blindness.Daniel J. Simons, Christopher Chabris & Tatiana Schnur - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):78-97.
    People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply (...)
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  • Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects (...)
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  • Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
  • Differential Effect of Distractor Timing on Localizing Versus Identifying Visual Changes.Katsumi Watanabe - 2003 - Cognition 88 (2):243-257.
  • Evidential Externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.
    Consider the Evidence Question: When and under what conditions is proposition P evidence for some agent S? Silins (Philos Perspect 19:375–404, 2005) has recently offered a partial answer to the Evidence Question. In particular, Silins argues for Evidential Internalism (EI), which holds that necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. In this paper I consider Silins’s argument, and offer two response on behalf of Evidential Externalism (EE), which is the denial of (...)
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  • Is a Pre-Change Object Representation Weakened Under Correct Detection of a Change?☆.Yei-Yu Yeh & Cheng-Ta Yang - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):91-102.
    We investigated whether a pre-change representation is inhibited or weakened under correct change detection. Two arrays of six objects were rapidly presented for change detection in three experiments. After detection, the perceptual identification of degraded stimuli was tested in Experiments 1 and 2. The weakening of a pre-change representation was not observed under correct detection. The repetition priming effect was observed for a pre-change object and the magnitude was equivalent to the effect for a post-change object. Under change blindness, repetition (...)
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  • Visual Long-Term Memory and Change Blindness: Different Effects of Pre- and Post-Change Information on One-Shot Change Detection Using Meaningless Geometric Objects.Megumi Nishiyama & Jun Kawaguchi - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:105-117.
  • Change Blindness Blindness: Beliefs About the Roles of Intention and Scene Complexity in Change Detection.Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie Angelone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
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  • A Dissociation Between Selective Attention and Conscious Awareness in the Representation of Temporal Order Information.Martin Eimer & Anna Grubert - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:274-281.
  • Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Fred Keijzer & Maurice Schouten - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):109 - 125.
    We argue that embedded cognition provides an argument against Jaegwon Kim’s neural reduction of mental causation. Because some mental, or at least psychological processes have to be cast in an externalist way, Kim’s argument can be said to lead to the conclusion that mental causation is as safe as any other form of higher-level of causation.
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  • Testing the Implicit Processing Hypothesis of Precognitive Dream Experience.Milan Valášek, Caroline Watt, Jenny Hutton, Rebecca Neill, Rachel Nuttall & Grace Renwick - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 28:113-125.
  • Undetected Changes in Visible Stimuli Influence Subsequent Decisions.Axel Cleeremans - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):646-656.
    Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without any disruption [Simons, D. J., Franconeri, S. L., & Reimer, R. L. . Change blindness in the absence of a visual disruption. Perception, 29, 1143–1154]. Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. Using this method, David et al. [David, E., Laloyaux, C., Devue, C., & Cleeremans, A. . Change blindness to gradual changes in facial expressions. Psychologica (...)
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  • The Role of Relational Triggers in Event Perception.Lewis J. Baker & Daniel T. Levin - 2015 - Cognition 136:14-29.
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  • Determinants of Attentive Blank Stares. An EFRP Study.Agnieszka Fudali-Czyż, Piotr Francuz & Paweł Augustynowicz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 29:1-9.
  • Anxiety, Conscious Awareness and Change Detection.Sally M. Gregory & Anthony Lambert - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):69-79.
    Attentional scanning was studied in anxious and non-anxious participants, using a modified change detection paradigm. Participants detected changes in pairs of emotional scenes separated by two task irrelevant slides, which contained an emotionally valenced scene and a visual mask. In agreement with attentional control theory, change detection latencies were slower overall for anxious participants. Change detection in anxious, but not non-anxious, participants was influenced by the emotional valence and exposure duration of distractor scenes. When negative distractor scenes were presented at (...)
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  • Language and Memory for Motion Events: Origins of the Asymmetry Between Source and Goal Paths.Laura Lakusta & Barbara Landau - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (3):517-544.
    When people describe motion events, their path expressions are biased toward inclusion of goal paths (e.g., into the house) and omission of source paths (e.g., out of the house). In this paper, we explored whether this asymmetry has its origins in people’s non-linguistic representations of events. In three experiments, 4-year-old children and adults described or remembered manner of motion events that represented animate/intentional and physical events. The results suggest that the linguistic asymmetry between goals and sources is not fully rooted (...)
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  • Feature Binding in Visual Working Memory Evaluated by Type Identification Paradigm.Jun Saiki & Hirofumi Miyatsuji - 2007 - Cognition 102 (1):49-83.
  • Change Blindness and Priming: When It Does and Does Not Occur.Michael E. Silverman & Arien Mack - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.
    In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness . Using 3 × 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report . In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether (...)
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  • Lost in the Move? Secondary Task Performance Impairs Tactile Change Detection on the Body.Alberto Gallace, Sophia Zeeden, Brigitte Röder & Charles Spence - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):215-229.
    Change blindness, the surprising inability of people to detect significant changes between consecutively-presented visual displays, has recently been shown to affect tactile perception as well. Visual change blindness has been observed during saccades and eye blinks, conditions under which people’s awareness of visual information is temporarily suppressed. In the present study, we demonstrate change blindness for suprathreshold tactile stimuli resulting from the execution of a secondary task requiring bodily movement. In Experiment 1, the ability of participants to detect changes between (...)
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  • Change Blindness: Past, Present, and Future.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
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  • Bounded Awareness: What You Fail to See Can Hurt You. [REVIEW]Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (1):1-18.
    ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...)
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  • What's That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  • Detecting Continuity Violations in Infancy: A New Account and New Evidence From Covering and Tube Events.Su-hua Wang, Renée Baillargeon & Sarah Paterson - 2005 - Cognition 95 (2):129-173.
  • Culture and Change Blindness.Takahiko Masuda & Richard E. Nisbett - 2006 - Cognitive Science 30 (2):381-399.
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