Switch to: References

Citations of:

In The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision. Yale University Press (1980)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. De Finetti Coherence and Logical Consistency.James M. Dickey, Morris L. Eaton & William D. Sudderth - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):133-139.
    The logical consistency of a collection of assertions about events can be viewed as a special case of coherent probability assessments in the sense of de Finetti.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Juan Comesana - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 197--216.
    Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Principled Chances.Jonathan SchaAer - unknown
    There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: ill the Principal Principle, l21 the Basic Chance Principle, and l31 the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I ofier an account of chance which meets all three: L~-chance. So the good news is that L~-chance meets ill — l31. The bad news is that L~-chance turns out unlawful and unstable. But perhaps this is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Limits of Virtue Epistemology.Joshue Orozco - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):103-120.
    Since Ernest Sosa's (1980) seminal paper, a variety of views on the nature of intellectual virtues and their role in one's epistemic theory have emerged. These views, including Sosa's original, largely draw from moral counterparts for their motivation, articulation, and defense. Consider two broad accounts of intellectual virtues: -/- Consequentialist Conception (CC): An intellectual virtue is a stable disposition, ability, or power to reliably acquire epistemic goods (e.g., true belief and knowledge). -/- Aristotelian Conception (AC): An intellectual virtue is a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Indirect Practical Functions of Explanations.Erik Weber - 1993 - Philosophica 51.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can God Satisfice?Klaas Kraay - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.
    Three very prominent arguments for atheism are (1) the argument from sub-optimality, (2) the problem of no best world, and (3) the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. To date, it has not sufficiently been appreciated that several important criticisms of these arguments have all relied on a shared strategy. Although the details vary, the core of this strategy is to concede that God either cannot or need not achieve the best outcome in the relevant choice situation, but to insist that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   238 citations  
  • Patching Physics and Chemistry Together.Robert C. Bishop - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):710-722.
    The "usual story" regarding molecular chemistry is that it is roughly an application of quantum mechanics. That is to say, quantum mechanics supplies everything necessary and sufficient, both ontologically and epistemologically, to reduce molecular chemistry to quantum mechanics. This is a reductive story, to be sure, but a key explanatory element of molecular chemistry, namely molecular structure, is absent from the quantum realm. On the other hand, typical characterizations of emergence, such as the unpredictability or inexplicability of molecular structure based (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Mark of the Mental, by Karen Neander.David Kalkman & Kim Sterelny - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):565-576.
    A Mark of the Mental, by NeanderKaren. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. Pp. xv + 327.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Paradox of The Liar -- A Case of Mistaken Identity.Laurence Goldstein - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):9-13.
  • Self-Assembling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):329-353.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signaling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2010 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 73--85.
    In this paper, a concept of chance is introduced that is compatible with deterministic physical laws, yet does justice to our use of chance-talk in connection with typical games of chance. We take our cue from what Poincaré called "the method of arbitrary functions," and elaborate upon a suggestion made by Savage in connection with this. Comparison is made between this notion of chance, and David Lewis' conception.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Probability, Logic, and Probability Logic.Alan Hájek - 2001 - In Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell. pp. 362--384.
  • Deterministic Chance?J. Schaffer - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):113-140.
    Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just Os and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics.Marc Artiga - 2013 - Disputatio (37):265-281.
    Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Maximum Entropy and Probability Kinematics Constrained by Conditionals.Stefan Lukits - 2015 - Entropy 17 (4):1690-1700.
    Two open questions of inductive reasoning are solved: (1) does the principle of maximum entropy (pme) give a solution to the obverse Majerník problem; and (2) is Wagner correct when he claims that Jeffrey’s updating principle (jup) contradicts pme? Majerník shows that pme provides unique and plausible marginal probabilities, given conditional probabilities. The obverse problem posed here is whether pme also provides such conditional probabilities, given certain marginal probabilities. The theorem developed to solve the obverse Majerník problem demonstrates that in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Inductive Logic.James Hawthorne - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sections 1 through 3 present all of the main ideas behind the probabilistic logic of evidential support. For most readers these three sections will suffice to provide an adequate understanding of the subject. Those readers who want to know more about how the logic applies when the implications of hypotheses about evidence claims (called likelihoods) are vague or imprecise may, after reading sections 1-3, skip to section 6. Sections 4 and 5 are for the more advanced reader who wants a (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Lev Vaidman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is an approach to quantum mechanics according to which, in addition to the world we are aware of directly, there are many other similar worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • On Schizophrenic Experiences of the Neutron or Why We Should Believe in the Many‐Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Theory.Lev Vaidman - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):245 – 261.
    This is a philosophical paper in favor of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. The necessity of introducing many worlds is explained by analyzing a neutron interference experiment. The concept of the “measure of existence of a world” is introduced and some difficulties with the issue of probability in the framework of the MWI are resolved.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Bayesian Conditioning, the Reflection Principle, and Quantum Decoherence.Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 233--247.
  • Ontology, Semantics and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Formal Reconstruction. [REVIEW]Gert Jan Lokhorst - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (1):35 - 75.
    The paper presents a formal explication of the early Wittgenstein's views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It will be shown that Wittgenstein gave a language of thought analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics will be given.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conditional Degree of Belief.Jan Sprenger - unknown
    It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Overdetermination in Intuitive Causal Decision Theory.Esteban Céspedes - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V.
    Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect Causal decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that the concept of causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is not the most intuitive one. Since overdetermination poses problems for a counterfactual theory of causation, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function, and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining new (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Indispensability of (Im)Possibilia.Martin Vacek - 2013 - Humana Mente 6 (25).
    According to modal realism formulated by David Lewis, there exist concrete possible worlds. As he argues the hypothesis is serviceable and that is a sufficient reason to think it is true. On the other side, Lewis does not consider the pragmatic reasons to be conclusive. He admits that the theoretical benefits of modal realism can be illusory or that the acceptance of controversial ontology for the sake of theoretical benefits might be misguided in the first place. In the first part (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Updating Probability: Tracking Statistics as Criterion.Bas C. van Fraassen & Joseph Y. Halpern - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv027.
    ABSTRACT For changing opinion, represented by an assignment of probabilities to propositions, the criterion proposed is motivated by the requirement that the assignment should have, and maintain, the possibility of matching in some appropriate sense statistical proportions in a population. This ‘tracking’ criterion implies limitations on policies for updating in response to a wide range of types of new input. Satisfying the criterion is shown equivalent to the principle that the prior must be a convex combination of the possible posteriors. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Genuine Modal Realism: Still Limited.John Divers & Joseph Melia - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):731-740.
    In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Paseau has said, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?Marc Lange - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
    I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Infinitesimal Probabilities.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):509-552.
    Non-Archimedean probability functions allow us to combine regularity with perfect additivity. We discuss the philosophical motivation for a particular choice of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory and answer some philosophical objections that have been raised against infinitesimal probabilities in general. _1_ Introduction _2_ The Limits of Classical Probability Theory _2.1_ Classical probability functions _2.2_ Limitations _2.3_ Infinitesimals to the rescue? _3_ NAP Theory _3.1_ First four axioms of NAP _3.2_ Continuity and conditional probability _3.3_ The final axiom of NAP (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?Stephen R. Grimm - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
    Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of "grasping" that seems to be characteristic of understanding (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Path-Specific Effects.Naftali Weinberger - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):53-76.
    A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1974]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on Pearl ([2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were they to be transmitted only via P. Facts about such effects may (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem.Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):637 - 670.
    A paper on how to adapt your probabilisitc beliefs when learning a conditional.
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning, and the Emergence of Cooperation.J. McKenzie Alexander - unknown
    Cheap talk has often been thought incapable of supporting the emergence of cooperation because costless signals, easily faked, are unlikely to be reliable. I show how, in a social network model of cheap talk with reinforcement learning, cheap talk does enable the emergence of cooperation, provided that individuals also temporally discount the past. This establishes one mechanism that suffices for moving a population of initially uncooperative individuals to a state of mutually beneficial cooperation even in the absence of formal institutions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Essential Properties - Analysis and Extension.Nathan Wildman - 2011 - Dissertation, Cambridge
  • Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Laws Are Persistent Inductives Schemes.Wolfgang Spohn - 2004 - In F. Stadler (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 11--135.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of formalizing defeasible reasoning or inductive schemes seems ideally suited to explicate the idea in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
    Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Deterministic Causation.Wolfgang Spohn - 2001 - In Wolfgang Spohn, Marion Ledwig & Michael Esfeld (eds.), Current Issues in Causation. Mentis. pp. 21-46.
    This paper is the most complete presentation of my views on deterministic causation. It develops the deterministic theory in perfect parallel to my theory of probabilistic causation and thus unites the two aspects. It also argues that the theory presented is superior to all regularity and all counterfactual theories of causation.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Causation, Coherence and Concepts : A Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknown
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):249-264.
    Modern theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Still, the general topic remained a genuinely philosophical one. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview. Section 2 explains the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality can be given; the questions turn out to be quite unevenly addressed in the literature. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions.J. -W. Romeyn - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):333-364.
    ABSTRACT. This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generating inductive predictions. After discussing Carnap –Hintikka inductive logic, hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. One partition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the other results in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following these examples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductive assumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately any inductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Tool Migration: A Framework for Analyzing Cross-Disciplinary Use of Mathematical Constructs.Chia-Hua Lin - unknown
    Mathematical formalisms that are constructed for inquiry in one disciplinary context are sometimes applied to another, a phenomenon that I call ‘tool migration.’ Philosophers of science have addressed the advantages of using migrated tools. In this paper, I argue that tool migration can be epistemically risky. I then develop an analytic framework for better understanding the risks that are implicit in tool migration. My approach shows that viewing mathematical constructs as tools while also acknowledging their representational features allows for a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Additivity Requirements in Classical and Quantum Probability.John Earman - unknown
    The discussion of different principles of additivity for probability functions has been largely focused on the personalist interpretation of probability. Very little attention has been given to additivity principles for physical probabilities. The form of additivity for quantum probabilities is determined by the algebra of observables that characterize a physical system and the type of quantum state that is realizable and preparable for that system. We assess arguments designed to show that only normal quantum states are realizable and preparable and, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Wisdom in Theology.Stephen R. Grimm - forthcoming - In William and Frederick Abraham and Aquino (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for Explanation.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):481-497.
    Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one's puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to answer both of these questions. I also suggest ways in which our account of scientific rationality might benefit from having a better sense of the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations