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  1. Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
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  • What Makes You Think You Are Conscious? An Agnosticist Manifesto.Cees van Leeuwen - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • Gossip-Based Self-Organising Agent Societies and the Impact of False Gossip.Sharmila Savarimuthu, Maryam Purvis, Martin Purvis & Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (4):419-441.
    The objective of this work is to demonstrate how cooperative sharers and uncooperative free riders can be placed in different groups of an electronic society in a decentralised manner. We have simulated an agent-based open and decentralised P2P system which self-organises itself into different groups to avoid cooperative sharers being exploited by uncooperative free riders. This approach encourages sharers to move to better groups and restricts free riders into those groups of sharers without needing centralised control. Our approach is suitable (...)
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  • Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society.Enea Pestelacci, Marco Tomassini & Leslie Luthi - 2008 - Biological Theory 3 (2):139-153.
    Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents’ strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through (...)
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  • Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  • Dynamic Networks and the Stag Hunt: Some Robustness Considerations.Brian Skyrms - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):7-9.
  • Sort Out Your Neighbourhood.Kai P. Spiekermann - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294.
    Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they (...)
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  • Human Cooperation.David G. Rand & Martin A. Nowak - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (8):413.
  • The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (2):223-237.
    Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the (...)
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  • Natural Social Contracts.Brian Skyrms - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):179-184.
    There are two fundamental problems for instituting a social contract. The first is cooperating to produce a surplus; the second is deciding how to divide this surplus. I represent each problem by a simple paradigm game, a Stag Hunt game for cooperating to produce a surplus, and a bargaining game for its division. I will discuss these simple games in isolation, and end by discussing their composition.
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  • Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning.Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):237-256.
    We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, (...)
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  • Faithful Description and the Incommensurability of Evolved Languages.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):123 - 137.
    Skyrms-Lewis signaling games illustrate how meaningful language may evolve from initially meaningless random signals (Lewis, Convention 1969; Skyrms 2008). Here we will consider how incommensurable languages might evolve in the context of signaling games. We will also consider the types of incommensurability exhibited between evolved languages in such games. We will find that sequentially evolved languages may be strongly incommensurable while still allowing for increasingly faithful descriptions of the world.
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  • An Agent-Based Simulation for Restricting Exploitation in Electronic Societies Through Social Mechanisms.Sharmila Savarimuthu, Maryam Purvis, Martin Purvis & Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu - 2015 - AI and Society 30 (3):345-358.