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Choice and Chance

Belmont, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co. (1966)

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  1. Local, General and Universal Prediction Strategies: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction.Gerhard Schurz - unknown
    In this paper I present a game-theoretical approach to the problem of induction. I investigate the comparative success of prediction methods by mathematical analysis and computer programming. Hume's problem lies in the fact that although the success of object-inductive prediction strategies is quite robust, they cannot be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal, modulo short-run losses which are upper-bounded. I (...)
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  • Emergent Chance.Christian List & Marcus Pivato - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):119-152.
    We offer a new argument for the claim that there can be non-degenerate objective chance (“true randomness”) in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, we show how objective chance at a higher level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, our argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties (...)
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  • Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Inductive Logic.Franz Huber - 2008 - In J. Lachs R. Talisse (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.
    Logic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of premises and a conclusion. The quality of an argument depends on at least two factors: the truth of the premises, and the strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion. The truth of the premises is a contingent factor that depends on the state of the world. The strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion is supposed to be independent of the state of (...)
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  • Aspects of Theory-Ladenness in Data-Intensive Science.Wolfgang Pietsch - unknown
    Recent claims, mainly from computer scientists, concerning a largely automated and model-free data-intensive science have been countered by critical reactions from a number of philosophers of science. The debate suffers from a lack of detail in two respects, regarding the actual methods used in data-intensive science and the specific ways in which these methods presuppose theoretical assumptions. I examine two widely-used algorithms, classificatory trees and non-parametric regression, and argue that these are theory-laden in an external sense, regarding the framing of (...)
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  • Confirmation Theory.Patrick Maher - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Ed.
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  • Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.
    Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...)
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  • A Difference-Making Account of Causation.Wolfgang Pietsch - unknown
    A difference-making account of causality is proposed that is based on a counterfactual definition, but differs from traditional counterfactual approaches to causation in a number of crucial respects: it introduces a notion of causal irrelevance; it evaluates the truth-value of counterfactual statements in terms of difference-making; it renders causal statements background-dependent. On the basis of the fundamental notions 'causal relevance' and 'causal irrelevance', further causal concepts are defined including causal factors, alternative causes, and importantly inus-conditions. Problems and advantages of the (...)
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  • Agent-Based Computational Models and Generative Social Science.Joshua M. Epstein - 1999 - Complexity 4 (5):41-60.
  • Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  • On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments From Explanations.Matthew W. McKeon - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):283-303.
    Even with the lack of consensus on the nature of an argument, the thesis that explanations and arguments are distinct is near orthodoxy in well-known critical thinking texts and in the more advanced argumentation literature. In this paper, I reconstruct two rationales for distinguishing arguments from explanations. According to one, arguments and explanations are essentially different things because they have different structures. According to the other, while some explanations and arguments may have the same structure, they are different things because (...)
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  • Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.
    Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...)
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  • The Structure of Causal Evidence Based on Eliminative Induction.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):421-435.
    It is argued that in deterministic contexts evidence for causal relations states whether a boundary condition makes a difference or not to a phenomenon. In order to substantiate the analysis, I show that this difference/indifference making is the basic type of evidence required for eliminative induction in the tradition of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill. To this purpose, an account of eliminative induction is proposed with two distinguishing features: it includes a method to establish the causal irrelevance of boundary (...)
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  • Contradictory Information: Too Much of a Good Thing. [REVIEW]J. Michael Dunn - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):425 - 452.
    Both I and Belnap, motivated the "Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic" by talk of the reasoner being simply "told true" (T) and simply "told false" (F), which leaves the options of being neither "told true" nor "told false" (N), and being both "told true" and "told false" (B). Belnap motivated these notions by consideration of unstructured databases that allow for negative information as well as positive information (even when they conflict). We now experience this on a daily basis with the Web. But (...)
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  • Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
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  • Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games.Gerhard Schurz - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):200-220.
    The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally (...)
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  • The Science Veil Over Tort Law Policy: How Should Scientific Evidence Be Utilized in Toxic Tort Law? [REVIEW]Carl F. Cranor - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 24 (2):139 - 210.
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  • Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  • Undercutting the Idea of Carving Reality.Crawford L. Elder - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):41-59.
    It is widely supposed that, in Hilary Putnam’s phrase, there are no “ready-made objects” (Putnam 1982; cf. Putnam 1981, Ch. 3). Instead the objects we consider real are partly of our own making: we carve them out of the world (or out of experience). The usual reason for supposing this lies in the claim that there are available to us alternative ways of “dividing reality” into objects (to quote the title of Hirsch 1993), ways which would afford us every bit (...)
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  • Defining Deduction, Induction, and Validity.Jan J. Wilbanks - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (1):107-124.
    In this paper I focus on two contrasting concepts of deduction and induction that have appeared in introductory (formal) logic texts over the past 75 years or so. According to the one, deductive and inductive arguments are defined solely by reference to what arguers claim about the relation between the premises and the conclusions. According to the other, they are defined solely by reference to that relation itself. Arguing that these definitions have defects that are due to their simplicity, I (...)
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  • Composition and Division.John Woods & Douglas Walton - 1977 - Studia Logica 36 (4):381 - 406.
  • Vagueness and Inductive Molding.J. R. Welch - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):147-172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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