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  1. The tragedy of the AI commons.Travis LaCroix & Aydin Mohseni - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-33.
    Policy and guideline proposals for ethical artificial intelligence research have proliferated in recent years. These are supposed to guide the socially-responsible development of AI for a common good. However, there typically exist incentives for non-cooperation ; and, these proposals often lack effective mechanisms to enforce their own normative claims. The situation just described constitutes a social dilemma—namely, a situation where no one has an individual incentive to cooperate, though mutual cooperation would lead to the best outcome for all involved. In (...)
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  • Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
    This paper applies the theoretical criteria laid out by D’Arms et al. to various aspects of evolutionary models of signalling. The question that D’Arms et al. seek to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the models that we use to explain the phenomena in question conceptually adequate? The conceptual adequacy question relates the formal aspects of the model to those aspects of the natural world that the model is supposed to capture. Moreover, this paper extends the analysis of D’Arms (...)
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  • Invariance and Symmetry in Evolutionary Dynamics.Simon M. Huttegger, Hannah Rubin & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (1):63-78.
    The concept of fitness is central to evolutionary biology. Models of evolutionary change typically use some quantity called “fitness” which measures an organism’s reproductive success. But what exactly does it mean that fitness is such a measure? In what follows, we look at the interplay between abstract evolutionary models and quantitative measures of fitness and develop a measurement-theoretic perspective on fitness in order to explore what makes certain measures of fitness significant.
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  • Finding Alternatives to Handicap Theory.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):127-132.
    The Handicap Principle represents a central theory in the biological understanding of signaling. This paper presents a number of alternative theories to the Handicap Principle and argues that some of these theories may provide a better explanation for the evolution and stability of honest communication.
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  • Signalling games select horn strategies.Robert van Rooy - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527.
    In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
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  • Hume’s Game-Theoretic Business Ethics.Peter Vanderschraaf - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):47-67.
    In recent years, a number of authors have used gametheoretic reasoning to explain why purely self-interested agentswould ever conform their economic activities with the requirements of justice, when by doing so they forego opportunities to reapunilateral net gains by exploiting others. In this paper, I argue that Hume's justification of honest economic exchanges between self-interested agents in the Treatise foreshadows this contemporary literature. Hume analyzes the problem of explaining justice in self-interested economic exchange as a problem of agents coordinating on (...)
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  • Stability and explanatory significance of some simple evolutionary models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  • Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, and “The Logic of Decision”.Brian Skyrms - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S104-S111.
    We show how Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calculating expected fitness for correlated encounters in general. As an illustration, some puzzles about kin selection are resolved.
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  • Altruism, inclusive fitness, and "the logic of decision".Brian Skyrms - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S104-S111.
    We show how Richard Jeffrey’s The Logic of Decision provides the proper formalism for calculating expected fitness for correlated encounters in general. As an illustration, some puzzles about kin selection are resolved.
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  • An economic approach to the evolution of male-female exchange.William O. Shropshire - 2003 - Human Nature 14 (3):235-266.
    Males and females of a number of animal species divide labor and provide jointly for offspring. Males may provide food, for example, while females protect defenseless young. This exchange is unlikely, however, unless a prior partnership has been established in which a female practices fidelity in exchange for a male’s provisioning activity. The formation of the trading partnership is itself an exchange, and economic theory can help explain when and why there are mutual gains from trading fidelity for resources. Environmental (...)
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  • Social niche construction and evolutionary transitions in individuality.P. A. Ryan, S. T. Powers & R. A. Watson - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (1):59-79.
    Social evolution theory conventionally takes an externalist explanatory stance, treating observed cooperation as explanandum and the positive assortment of cooperative behaviour as explanans. We ask how the circumstances bringing about this positive assortment arose in the first place. Rather than merely push the explanatory problem back a step, we move from an externalist to an interactionist explanatory stance, in the spirit of Lewontin and the Niche Construction theorists. We develop a theory of ‘social niche construction’ in which we consider biological (...)
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  • Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism.Hannah Rubin - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1175-1189.
    While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to evolve to a stable polymorphic population where the majority of organisms are altruistic. Further, adding stochasticity leads to even larger numbers of altruists, while adding stochasticity to an analogous asexual model leads to more selfish organisms. The contrast (...)
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  • Evolution of conventional meaning and conversational principles.Van Rooy Robert - 2004 - Synthese 139 (2):331-366.
    In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful communication in terms of standard game theory requires agents to be very rational and fully informed. The main goal of the paper is to show that in terms of evolutionary game theory we can motivate the emergence and self-sustaining force of (...)
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  • Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group selection.Grant Ramsey & Robert Brandon - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (3):385-400.
    Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group selection. In this paper, we argue that the original interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at (...)
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  • Social evolution and strategic thinking.Johannes Martens - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):697-715.
    Thinking about organisms as if they were rational agents which could choose their own phenotypic traits according to their fitness values is a common heuristic in the field of evolutionary theory. In a 1998 paper, however, Elliott Sober has emphasized several alleged shortcomings of this kind of analogical reasoning when applied to the analysis of social behaviors. According to him, the main flaw of this heuristic is that it proves to be a misleading tool when it is used for predicting (...)
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  • Inclusive Fitness and the Maximizing-Agent Analogy.Johannes Martens - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw003.
    ABSTRACT In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms and Elliott Sober, who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, Savage’s model —can (...)
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  • Inclusive Fitness as a Measure of Biological Utility.Johannes Martens - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):1-22.
    This article is about the analogy between inclusive fitness and utility. In behavioral ecology, it is often assumed that individual organisms behave as if they were “striving” to maximize their inclusive fitness—a measure analogue to the kind of utility function that is used to represent the preferences of rational agents. Here, I explore some conceptual puzzles related to this view and question whether the kind of biological utility posited by the advocates of the “maximizing agent analogy” can be adequately interpreted (...)
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  • Hamilton meets causal decision theory.Johannes Martens - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 77:101187.
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  • Reflections on ethics and game theory.Steven T. Kuhn - 2004 - Synthese 141 (1):1 - 44.
    Applications of game theory to moral philosophy are impededby foundational issues and troublesome examples. In the first part of this paper,questions are raised about the appropriate game-theoretical frameworks for applications to moralphilosophy and about the proper interpretations of the theoretical devices employed inthese frameworks. In the second part, five examples that should be of particular interest to thoseinterested in the connections between ethics and game theory are delineated and discussed. Thefirst example comprises games in which there is an outcome unanimously (...)
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  • Individualist and multi-level perspectives on selection in structured populations.Benjamin Kerr & Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (4):477-517.
    Recent years have seen a renewed debate over the importance of groupselection, especially as it relates to the evolution of altruism. Onefeature of this debate has been disagreement over which kinds ofprocesses should be described in terms of selection at multiple levels,within and between groups. Adapting some earlier discussions, we presenta mathematical framework that can be used to explore the exactrelationships between evolutionary models that do, and those that donot, explicitly recognize biological groups as fitness-bearing entities.We show a fundamental set (...)
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  • Varieties of population structure and the levels of selection.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):25-50.
    Group-structured populations, of the kind prominent in discussions of multilevel selection, are contrasted with ‘neighbor-structured’ populations. I argue that it is a necessary condition on multilevel description of a selection process that there should be a nonarbitrary division of the population into equivalence classes (or an approximation to this situation). The discussion is focused via comparisons between two famous problem cases involving group structure (altruism and heterozygote advantage) and two neighbor-structured cases that resemble them. Conclusions are also drawn about the (...)
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  • Local Interaction, Multilevel Selection, and Evolutionary Transitions.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):372-380.
    Group-structured and neighbor-structured populations are compared, especially in relation to multilevel selection theory and evolutionary transitions. I argue that purely neighborstructured populations, which can feature the evolution of altruism, are not properly described in multilevel terms. The ability to “gestalt switch” between individualist and multilevel frameworks is then linked to the investigation of “major transitions” in evolution. Some explanatory concepts are naturally linked to one framework or the other, but a full understanding is best achieved via the use of both.
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  • Group intentions as equilibria.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
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  • Use theories of meaning.Marc Staudacher - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    This dissertation is a contribution to the philosophy of language. Its central question is: In virtue of which facts do linguistic expressions mean what they do? E.g. why does “apple” mean apple in English? The question receives a systematic answer; in short: Linguistic expressions mean what they do because among their users, there are linguistic conventions and social norms to use and understand them in certain ways. The answer is clarified and defended as a central thesis. For in this form, (...)
     
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  • Information, Interaction, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek (ed.) - 2005 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Contemporary epistemological and cognitive studies, as well as recent trends in computer science and game theory have revealed an increasingly important and intimate relationship between Information, Interaction, and Agency. Agents perform actions based on the available information and in the presence of other interacting agents. From this perspective Information, Interaction, and Agency neatly ties together classical themes like rationality, decision-making and belief revision with games, strategies and learning in a multi-agent setting. Unified by the central notions Information, Interaction, and Agency, (...)
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  • Evolutionary game theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.