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  1. The Evolutionary Puzzle of Guilt: Individual or Group Selection?Michael Deem & Grant Ramsey - 2016 - Understanding Guilt.
    Some unpleasant emotions, like fear and disgust, appear straightforwardly susceptible to evolutionary explanation on account of the benefits they seem to provide to individuals. But guilt is more puzzling in this respect. Like other unpleasant emotions, guilt is often associated with a host of negative effects on the individual, such as psychological suffering and social withdrawal. Moreover, many guilt-induced behaviors, such as revealing one’s offenses and placing oneself before the mercy of others, could levy a cost to individuals that is (...)
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  • A Graphic Measure for Game-Theoretic Robustness.Patrick Grim, Randy Au, Nancy Louie, Robert Rosenberger, William Braynen & Evan Selinger - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):273-297.
    Robustness has long been recognized as an important parameter for evaluating game-theoretic results, but talk of ‘robustness’ generally remains vague. What we offer here is a graphic measure for a particular kind of robustness (‘matrix robustness’), using a three-dimensional display of the universe of 2 × 2 game theory. In such a measure specific games appear as specific volumes (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.), allowing a graphic image of the extent of particular game-theoretic effects in terms of those games. The (...)
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  • Open Problems in Logic and Games.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    Dov Gabbay is a prolific logician just by himself. But beyond that, he is quite good at making other people investigate the many further things he cares about. As a result, King's College London has become a powerful attractor in our field worldwide. Thus, it is a great pleasure to be an organizer for one of its flagship events: the Augustus de Morgan Workshop of 2005. Benedikt Loewe and I proposed the topic of 'interactive logic' for this occasion, with an (...)
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  • A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: The Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice.Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André & Dan Sperber - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):59-122.
    What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate question or as an ultimate question. The question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful (...)
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  • Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism.John Thrasher - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):423-436.
    Epicurean contractarianism is an attempt to reconcile individualistic hedonism with a robust account of justice. The pursuit of pleasure and the requirements of justice, however, have seemed to be incompatible to many commentators, both ancient and modern. It is not clear how it is possible to reconcile hedonism with the demands of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear why, even if Epicurean contractarianism is possible, it would be necessary for Epicureans to endorse a social contract. I argue here that Epicurean (...)
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  • The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals.Fritz Allhoff - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97-114.
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...)
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  • Anarchy, Socialism and a Darwinian Left.Ellen Clarke - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):136-150.
    In A Darwinian left Peter Singer aims to reconcile Darwinian theory with left wing politics, using evolutionary game theory and in particular a model proposed by Robert Axelrod, which shows that cooperation can be an evolutionarily successful strategy. In this paper I will show that whilst Axelrod’s model can give support to a kind of left wing politics, it is not the kind that Singer himself envisages. In fact, it is shown that there are insurmountable problems for the idea of (...)
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  • Cooperation and Competition in Apes and Humans: A Comparative and Pragmatic Approach to Human Uniqueness.Anne Reboul - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):423-441.
    In Why We Cooperate , Tomasello addresses the problem of human uniqueness, which has become the focus for a lot of recent research at the frontier between the Humanities and the Life Sciences. Being both a developmental psychologist and a primatologist, Tomasello is especially well suited to tackle the subject, and the present book is the most recent one in a series of books and papers by himself and his colleagues . Tomasello's basic position is squarely a dual-inheritance account, in (...)
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  • La argumentación a la luz de la filosofía de la biología.Yáñez Cristián Santibáñez - 2016 - Revista de Filosofía 72:165-182.
    Se ofrece una respuesta inicial a la pregunta sobre el recorrido evolutivo de la competencia argumentativa. Se asume decididamente la hipótesis de la intencionalidad colectiva y la cooperación como rasgos estructurales que permiten entender la argumentación como un fenómeno normativo. Se concluye que la argumentación fue producto de una presión selectiva para la multiplicación de representaciones alternativas provenientes de una mayor cantidad de agentes de un mismo o diferente grupo. La presión evolutiva seleccionó la comunicación de buenas razones a través (...)
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  • Steps Towards an Evolutionary Account of Argumentative Competence.Santibáñez Yáñéz Cristián - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (2):167-182.
    In this paper a tentative explanation of the competence of argumentation from an evolutionary point of view is offered. Because in contemporary argumentation theory and the informal logic approach the evolutionary perspective has been neglected, this paper gives an initial overview on the matter with the hope that core aspects of the argumentative faculty—such as argumentative normativity, the function of arguments, or fallacious moves, among others—can be seen differently afterwards. In order to specify the proposal, the main concepts considered are (...)
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  • Conventions and Moral Norms: The Legacy of Lewis.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):73-86.
    David Lewis’ Convention has been a major source of inspiration for philosophers and social scientists alike for the analysis of norms. In this essay, I demonstrate its usefulness for the analysis of some moral norms. At the same time, conventionalism with regards to moral norms has attracted sustained criticism. I discuss three major strands of criticism and propose how these can be met. First, I discuss the criticism that Lewis conventions analyze norms in situations with no conflict of interest, whereas (...)
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  • Conventions, Norms and Law.B. J. E. Verbeek - unknown
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  • Public Reason's Chaos Theorem.Brian Kogelmann - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):200-219.
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  • Trust and Risk in Games of Partial Information.Robin Clark - 2013 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 8 (1).
    Games of partial information have been used to explicate Gricean implicature; their solution concept has been murky, however. In this paper, I will develop a simple solution concept that can be used to solve games of partial information, depending on the players' mutual trust and tolerance for risk. In addition, I will develop an approach to non-conventional quantity implicatures that relies on "face", Brown and Levinson ).
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  • Helen Frowe’s “Practical Account of Self-Defence”: A Critique.Uwe Steinhoff - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):87-96.
    Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...)
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  • The Co-Evolution of Tools and Minds: Cognition and Material Culture in the Hominin Lineage.Ben Jeffares - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):503-520.
    The structuring of our environment to provide cues and reminders for ourselves is common: We leave notes on the fridge, we have a particular place for our keys where we deposit them, making them easy to find. We alter our world to streamline our cognitive tasks. But how did hominins gain this capacity? What pushed our ancestors to structure their physical environment in ways that buffered thinking and began the process of using the world cognitively? I argue that the capacity (...)
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  • Partner Selection, Coordination Games, and Group Selection.Michael S. Alvard - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):80-81.
    The process of partner selection reflects ethnographic realities where cooperative rewards obtain that would otherwise be lost to loners. Baumard et al. neglect frequency-dependent processes exemplified by games of coordination. Such games can produce multiple equilibria that may or may not include fair outcomes. Additional, group-selection processes are required to produce the outcomes predicted by the models.
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  • The Evolution of Guilt.Cailin O'Connor - unknown
    Using evolutionary game theory, I consider how guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to actors both before and after bad behavior. This supplements recent work by philosophers on the evolution of guilt with a more complete picture of the relevant selection pressures.
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  • The Methods of Ethics. Conflicts Built to Last.Björn Eriksson - unknown
    An impressive amount of evidence from psychology, cognitive neurology, evolutionary psychology and primatology seems to be converging on a ‘dual process’ model of moral or practical (in the philosophical sense) psychology according to which our practical judgments are generated by two distinct processes, one ‘emotive-intuitive’ and one ‘cognitive-utilitarian’. In this paper I approach the dual process model from several directions, trying to shed light on various aspects of our moral and practical lives.
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  • Computer Simulations in Game Theory.Paul Weirich - manuscript
    A computer simulation runs a model generating a phenomenon under investigation. For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory. The model must be isomorphic to the natural system that realizes the phenomenon. This paper elaborates the method of assessing a simulation's explanatory power. Then it illustrates the method by applying it to two simulations in game theory. The first is Brian Skyrms's (1990) simulation of interactive deliberations. It is intended to explain the emergence of a Nash (...)
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  • Sender-Receiver Systems Within and Between Organisms.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):866-878.
    Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolved by seeing the (...)
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  • Initiating Coordination.Paul Weirich - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):790-801.
    How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. ‡I thank the audience at my paper's presentation at the 2006 PSA meeting for many insightful points. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211; e-mail: WeirichP@missouri.edu.
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  • A Framework for Community-Based Salience: Common Knowledge, Common Understanding and Community Membership.Cyril Hédoin - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):365-395.
  • Hobbes’s State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis.hun CHung - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):485--508.
    Hobbes’s own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that, without a government, our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes’s state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of (...)
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  • The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  • Gauthier and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Steven Kuhn - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):659-676.
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  • The Evolution of Intersectional Oppression.Cailin O'Connor, Liam Kofi Bright & Justin Bruner - unknown
    Intersectionality theory explores the special sorts of disadvantage that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. One significant methodological problem for the quantitative study of intersectionality is the difficulty of acquiring data sets large enough to produce significant results when one is looking for intersectional effects. For this reason, we argue, simulation methods may be particularly useful to this branch of theorizing because they can generate precise predictions and causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and can (...)
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  • Varieties of Population Structure and the Levels of Selection.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):25-50.
    Group-structured populations, of the kind prominent in discussions of multilevel selection, are contrasted with ‘neighbor-structured’ populations. I argue that it is a necessary condition on multilevel description of a selection process that there should be a nonarbitrary division of the population into equivalence classes (or an approximation to this situation). The discussion is focused via comparisons between two famous problem cases involving group structure (altruism and heterozygote advantage) and two neighbor-structured cases that resemble them. Conclusions are also drawn about the (...)
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  • The Implications of Learning Across Perceptually and Strategically Distinct Situations.Daniel Cownden, Kimmo Eriksson & Pontus Strimling - 2016 - Synthese:1-18.
    Game theory is a formal approach to behavior that focuses on the strategic aspect of situations. The game theoretic approach originates in economics but has been embraced by scholars across disciplines, including many philosophers and biologists. This approach has an important weakness: the strategic aspect of a situation, which is its defining quality in game theory, is often not its most salient quality in human cognition. Evidence from a wide range of experiments highlights this shortcoming. Previous theoretical and empirical work (...)
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  • Logic in Philosophy.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    1 Logic in philosophy The century that was Logic has played an important role in modern philosophy, especially, in alliances with philosophical schools such as the Vienna Circle, neopositivism, or formal language variants of analytical philosophy. The original impact was via the work of Frege, Russell, and other pioneers, backed up by the prestige of research into the foundations of mathematics, which was fast bringing to light those amazing insights that still impress us to-day. The Golden Age of the 1930s (...)
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  • The Instability of John Rawls's “Stability for the Right Reasons”.Hun Chung - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):1-17.
    John Rawls’s most mature notion of political order is “stability for the right reasons.” Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of “stability for the right reasons.” Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non- compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve (...)
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  • Précis of Understanding Institutions.Francesco Guala - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6):539-549.
    Understanding Institutions offers a theory that is able to unify the two dominant approaches in the scientific and philosophical literature on institutions. Moreover, using the ‘rules-in-equilibrium’ theory, it tackles several ancient puzzles in the philosophy of social science.
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  • Stability and Violence in Classical Greek Democracies and Oligarchies.Matthew Simonton - 2017 - Classical Antiquity 36 (1):52-103.
    Existing attempts to understand the relationship between violence and stability within Classical Athens are undermined by their failure to compare democracies with oligarchies. The exclusionary policies of oligarchies created a fragile political equilibrium that required considerable regulation if oligarchic regimes were to survive. By contrast, the inclusiveness of democracies largely defused the danger that disputes would lead to regime collapse. Citizens of democracies faced fewer incentives to police their behavior, resulting in higher levels of public disorder and violence; this violence, (...)
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  • Yet Another Skeptical Solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.
    After a brief discussion of the rule-following paradox and of Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution, I put forward my own skeptical solution to the paradox, which revolves around the idea that communication does not require meaning.
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  • On the Production and Ramification of Cooperation: The Cooperation Afforder with Framing Hypothesis.S. O. Kimbrough - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):111-136.
    This article presents a new proposal for understanding the establishment and maintenance of cooperation: the cooperation afforder with framing hypothesis, producing what can be called cooperation from afforder-framing . Three key moves are present. First, a special variety of the Stag Hunt game, the Cooperation Afforder game, will reliably produce mutualistic cooperation through an evolutionary process. Second, cognitive framing is a credible candidate mechanism to meet the special conditions and requirements of the Cooperation Afforder game. Third, once mutualistic cooperation is (...)
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  • Stakeholder’s Preference and Rational Compliance: A Comment on Sacconi’s “CSR as a Model for Extended Corporate Governance II: Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity”.Pedro Francés-gómez & Ariel del Rio - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 82 (1):59 - 76.
    Lorenzo Sacconi's recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders' conformist preferences - their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. (...)
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  • Evolution’s Republic: Groundwork for a Biosocial Contract.Alex Schulman - 2014 - Social Science Information 53 (4):518-541.
  • Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge?Ken Binmore - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27.
    Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...)
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  • Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):103-121.
    Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation . In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria (...)
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  • Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society.Enea Pestelacci, Marco Tomassini & Leslie Luthi - 2008 - Biological Theory 3 (2):139-153.
    Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents’ strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through (...)
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  • Computer Simulation of Dental Professionals as a Moral Community.David W. Chambers - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (3):467-476.
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  • Local Interaction, Multilevel Selection, and Evolutionary Transitions.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):372-380.
    Group-structured and neighbor-structured populations are compared, especially in relation to multilevel selection theory and evolutionary transitions. I argue that purely neighborstructured populations, which can feature the evolution of altruism, are not properly described in multilevel terms. The ability to “gestalt switch” between individualist and multilevel frameworks is then linked to the investigation of “major transitions” in evolution. Some explanatory concepts are naturally linked to one framework or the other, but a full understanding is best achieved via the use of both.
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  • Nuts and Bolts, Bells, Whistles, and Rust in the Social Sciences.Daniel Fairbrother - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (6):472-480.
    Here I discuss the philosophical contributions to Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of essays edited by Pierre Demeulenaere. I begin by introducing the idea of a social mechanism and showing that it has already had an impact within empirical analytical sociology. I then discuss some examples of the philosophical work offered in Demeulenaere’s collection in support of this analytical “movement” in the social sciences. I argue that some of these examples demonstrate thin scholarship and only a veneer of (...)
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  • Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  • GIRL Special Issue Introduction.Justine Jacot & Philip Pärnamets - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):483-490.
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  • On Salience and Signaling in Sender–Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points.Travis LaCroix - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In Lewis’ (Convention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Skyrms (Signals: evolution, learning & information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I (...)
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  • Dynamic Networks and the Stag Hunt: Some Robustness Considerations.Brian Skyrms - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):7-9.
  • Diversity, Tolerance, and the Social Contract.Justin P. Bruner - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):429-448.
  • Social Cognition, Stag Hunts, and the Evolution of Language.Richard Moore - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):797-818.
    According to the socio-cognitive revolution hypothesis, humans but not other great apes acquire language because only we possess the socio-cognitive abilities required for Gricean communication, which is a pre-requisite of language development. On this view, language emerged only following a socio-cognitive revolution in the hominin lineage that took place after the split of the Pan-Homo clade. In this paper, I argue that the SCR hypothesis is wrong. The driving forces in language evolution were not sweeping biologically driven changes to hominin (...)
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  • The Impact of Population Bottlenecks on the Social Lives of Microbes.Makmiller Pedroso - 2018 - Biological Theory 13 (3):190-198.
    Microbes often live in association with dense multicellular aggregates, especially biofilms, and the construction of these aggregates typically requires microbial cells to produce public goods, such as enzymes and signaling molecules. Public-goods producers are, in turn, vulnerable to exploitation by free-rider cells that consume the public goods without paying for their production costs. The cell population of a biofilm or other microbial aggregates are expected to pass through bottlenecks due to a wide range of factors, such as antibiotic treatments and (...)
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