While the conversations surrounding moral cultivation in Confucianism often focus on the debate regarding the starting point of moral learning (and corresponding features of the learning process) that is inspired by the disagreements between the _Mengzi_ 孟子 and the _Xunzi_ 荀子, there is another group of scholarship on moral cultivation which tends to the experiential qualities felt by the learning agents. This essay participates in the latter group of scholarship. The majority of discussions regarding the learning experience center around mental (...) states such as _an_ 安 (tranquility or equanimity) and _le_ 樂 (happiness, joy, or pleasure) of a special kind. There is, nonetheless, a minor trend that emphasizes the significance of _you_ 憂 (worry or distress). In this essay, I raise attention to the significance of _you_ and argue that in the _Analects_, an indispensable and significant part of Confucian moral cultivation is to learn to worry well, which involves learning to worry broadly about society in general, and to worry deeply about particular individuals standing in important relationship to us_._. (shrink)

Aristotle’s best human life is attained through theoretical contemplation, and Confucius’ is attained through practical cultivation of the social self. However, I argue that in the best human life for both Confucius and Aristotle, a form of theoretical contemplation must occur and can only occur with an ethical commitment to community life. Confucius, like Aristotle, sees that the best contemplation comes after later-life, greater-learning and is central to ethical and community life. Aristotle, like Confucius, sees the best contemplation as presupposing (...) full ethical commitment to community life. So, I argue for the theses that: on Aristotle’s view, the best human contemplation requires one be fully morally good; on Confucius’ view, to be fully morally good requires the best human contemplation; being fully morally good for both requires commitment to the good of others and the community. (shrink)

This essay depicts the emergence of the notion of predetermined fate in early China by focusing on the changing meaning of the word ming 命. Many scholars have long interpreted the term ming in the Lunyu 論語 as a kind of inevitable fate, but I show that it is still subject to change depending on the will of an anthropomorphic Heaven. In the Warring States period, however, Heaven became increasingly conceived as following fixed patterns in its behavior, and the growing (...) belief in the validity of these patterns lead to the idea that the course of the future is more or less fixed and predictable. I argue that the idea of predetermined and predictable ming was a result of these changed conceptions of Heaven and the future. (shrink)

The philosophy of Confucius has often been accused of lacking classical definitions of its core concepts. However, as I shall argue, Confucius systematically used nonclassical definitions—to be precise, operational ones. The notion of operational definition comes from Percy Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics and means that the definiendum is defined by a set of operations that results in determining the meaning of the term in question. In the case of Confucian argumentation, operational definitions are mostly nominal and, in contrast (...) to unambiguous methods of measurement, also context-dependent. This results in there being various yet not mutually inconsistent definitions of one term, and in “paradigmatic examples” playing a crucial role. As I show, this mode of defining things had major implications for the content of Confucius’ thought. In fact, many of its forms could be traced back to other Chinese philosophers, including those of non-Confucian provenance. (shrink)

The Analects appears to offer two bodies of testimony regarding the felt, experiential qualities of leading a life of virtue. In its ostensible record of Confucius’ more abstract and reflective claims, the text appears to suggest that virtue has considerable power to afford joy and insulate from sorrow. In the text’s inclusion of Confucius’ less studied and apparently more spontaneous remarks, however, he appears sometimes to complain of the life he leads, to feel its sorrows, and to possess some despair. (...) Where we attend to both of these elements of the text, a tension emerges. In this essay, I consider how Confucius’ complaints appear to complicate any clean conclusion that Confucius wins a good life, particularly where we attend to important pre-theoretical sensibilities regarding what a “good life” ought to include and how it ought to feel for the one who leads it. (shrink)

The belief in heaven's mandate (tianming 天命) in earlier documents referred to divine‐ethical sanctions of political rulers. It later developed multiple implications such as an individual's destiny or fate and became one of the most fundamental concepts in Chinese intellectual and cultural history. In modern times, this concept has received long‐lasting attention in the field of Chinese philosophy, and almost all major scholars have more or less been involved in discussions and debates, especially on the topic of the classical Confucian (...) conception of heaven's mandate. Their discussions on this topic have largely focused on two major controversies: (i) whether early Confucians view heaven's mandate as prescriptive ethical command or descriptive amoral fate, and (ii) whether their attitude toward heaven's mandate is voluntarist or fatalistic. While this scholarship has been fruitful and insightful, it has continued for almost a century with certain variants. Therefore, it is time to address this topic with new approaches and hermeneutic horizons. In this essay, I propose a new approach and horizon to viewing the classical Confucian conception of heaven's mandate as their reflections on individual existence and self‐realization under the constraints of mandate or destiny. I examine the texts associated with Confucius and Mencius such as the Analects and the Mencius, as well as some recently unearthed texts, to suggest that early Confucians accommodate individual initiative and self‐determination of life choices through their conceptualization of heaven's mandate. To them, the vocabulary of heaven's mandate empowers individuals, especially through situating their places in society and the cosmos. By knowing and standing firmly on one's mandate or destiny, the individual not only realizes the value of their existence but also goes beyond the ultimate destiny of death. This fresh reading of heaven's mandate is grounded in the context of the development of Confucian ideas in the early period and presents an optimistic vision of Confucian humanism. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged (...) and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. (shrink)