Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Informational Nature of Personal Identity.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):549-566.
    In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In “Plato and the problem of the chariot”, I use Plato’s famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In “Egology and its two branches” and “Egology as synchronic individualisation”, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one concerning the (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Cogitor Ergo Sum: The Origin of Self-Awareness in Dyadic Interaction.Stephen Langfur - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (3):425-450.
    When I see a mountain to be far away, there is non-reflective awareness of myself as that from which distance is measured. Likewise, there is self-awareness when I see a tree as offering shade or a hiding place. In such cases, how can the self I am aware of be the same as I who am aware of it? Can the perceived be its perceiver? Mobilizing infancy research, I offer the following thesis as to how one can be aware of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Science Explain Consciousness?Bruiger Dan - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Can Science Explain Consciousness? Toward a Solution to the 'Hard Problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Principles for Consciousness in Integrated Cognitive Control.Ricardo Sanz, Ignacio Lopez, Manuel Rodriguez & Carlos Hernandez - 2007 - Neural Networks 20 (9):938-946.
    In this article we will argue that given certain conditions for the evolution of bi- ological controllers, these will necessarily evolve in the direction of incorporating consciousness capabilities. We will also see what are the necessary mechanics for the provision of these capabilities and extrapolate this vision to the world of artifi- cial systems postulating seven design principles for conscious systems. This article was published in the journal Neural Networks special issue on brain and conscious- ness.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Consciousness, Action Selection, Meaning and Phenomenic Anticipation.Ricardo Sanz, Carlos Hernández & M. G. Sánchez-Escribano - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):383-399.
  • AI and Affordances for Mental Action.McClelland Tom - unknown
    To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or situation as presenting an opportunity for action. The concept of affordances has been taken up across wide range of disciplines, including AI. I explore an interesting extension of the concept of affordances in robotics. Among the affordances that artificial systems have been engineered to detect are affordances to deliberate. In psychology, affordances are typically limited to bodily action, so the it is noteworthy that AI researchers have found it helpful to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Modélisation de la conscience dans les machines informatiques virtuelles. Fonctionnalisme et Phénoménologie.Igor Aleksander - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):447-454.
    L’article décrit les efforts employés par ceux qui travaillent sur des machines et des analyses informationnelles afin de fournir des clés de compréhension de la conscience et des hypothèses sur les moyens nécessaires à la fabrication d’une machine consciente. Le texte mentionne certaines origines de ces considérations et fait le compte rendu des contributions de plusieurs chercheurs. Une distinction est établie entre les approches fonctionnelles et phénoménologiques. Les premières mènent aux méthodes algorithmiques fondées sur la programmation conventionnelle, tandis que les (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti - 2007 - In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca.
  • An Integrative Pluralistic Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness.Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen & Christopher T. Kello - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 88--231.
  • The Meta-Problem and the Transfer of Knowledge Between Theories of Consciousness: A Software Engineer’s Take.Marcel Kvassay - manuscript
    This contribution examines two radically different explanations of our phenomenal intuitions, one reductive and one strongly non-reductive, and identifies two germane ideas that could benefit many other theories of consciousness. Firstly, the ability of sophisticated agent architectures with a purely physical implementation to support certain functional forms of qualia or proto-qualia appears to entail the possibility of machine consciousness with qualia, not only for reductive theories but also for the nonreductive ones that regard consciousness as ubiquitous in Nature. Secondly, analysis (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Distinguishing the Reflective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds: Is It Time for a Tri-Process Theory.Keith E. Stanovich - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88.
  • The Architecture of Mind as a Network of Networks of Natural Computational Processes.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2016 - Philosophies 1 (1):111--125.
    In discussions regarding models of cognition, the very mention of “computationalism” often incites reactions against the insufficiency of the Turing machine model, its abstractness, determinism, the lack of naturalist foundations, triviality and the absence of clarity. None of those objections, however, concerns models based on natural computation or computing nature, where the model of computation is broader than symbol manipulation or conventional models of computation. Computing nature consists of physical structures that form layered computational architecture, with computation processes ranging from (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
  • Explaining What?Elizabeth Irvine - 2014 - Topoi 36 (1):95-106.
    The Hard Problem is surrounded by a vast literature, to which it is increasingly hard to contribute to in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the strategy here is not to offer any new metaphysical or ‘in principle’ arguments in favour of the success of materialism, but to assume a Type Q approach and look to contemporary consciousness science to see how the concept of consciousness fares there, and what kind of explanations we can hope to offer of it. It is suggested (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Operative Mind: A Functional, Computational and Modeling Approach to Machine Consciousness.Carlos Hernández, Ignacio López & Ricardo Sanz - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):83-98.
  • Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.Drew McDermott - 2007 - In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150.
  • What Levels of Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences?Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi (eds.) - 2015 - Frontiers Media SA.
    Complex systems are to be seen as typically having multiple levels of organization. For instance, in the behavioural and cognitive sciences, there has been a long lasting trend, promoted by the seminal work of David Marr, putting focus on three distinct levels of analysis: the computational level, accounting for the What and Why issues, the algorithmic and the implementational levels specifying the How problem. However, the tremendous developments in neuroscience knowledge about processes at different scales of organization together with the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Are Emotion Theories About?Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    findings from affective neuroscience research. I shall focus mainly on, but in a manner which, I hope is.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How Velmans' Conscious Experiences Affected Our Brains.Ron Chrisley & Aaron Sloman - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):58-62.
    Velmans’ paper raises three problems concerning mental causation: (1) How can consciousness affect the physical, given that the physical world appears causally closed? 10 (2) How can one be in conscious control of processes of which one is not consciously aware? (3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. In an appendix Velmans gives his reasons for refusing to resolve these problems through adopting the position (which he labels ‘physicalism’) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why Some Machines May Need Qualia and How They Can Have Them (Including a Demanding New Turing Test for Robot Philosophers.).Aaron Sloman - unknown
    Many debates about consciousness appear to be endless, in part because of conceptual confusions preventing clarity as to what the issues are and what does or does not count as evidence. This makes it hard to decide what should go into a machine if it is to be described as 'conscious'. Thus, triumphant demonstrations by some AI developers may be regarded by others as proving nothing of interest because the system does not satisfy *their* definitions or requirements specifications.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ewolucja: inżynier systemów komputerowych projektujący umysły.Aaron Sloman - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
    [Przekład] To, czego w ciągu ostatnich sześciu lub siedmiu tego nauczyliśmy się na temat wirtualnej maszynerii w wyniku dużego postępu nauki i techniki, umożliwia nam zaoferowanie stanowisku darwinowskiemu nowej obrony przeciw krytykom, którzy twierdzili, że jedynie forma fizyczna – a nie zdolności umysłowe czy świadomość – może być produktem ewolucji poprzez dobór naturalny. Obrona ta porównuje zjawiska umysłowe, wspominane przez przeciwników Darwina, z treściami maszynerii wirtualnej w systemach obliczeniowych. Obiekty, stany, zdarzenia i procesy w owej maszynerii, które dopiero od niedawna (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Computational Model of Machine Consciousness.Janusz A. Starzyk & Dilip K. Prasad - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):255-281.
  • On the Claim That a Table-Lookup Program Could Pass the Turing Test.Drew McDermott - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (2):143-188.
    The claim has often been made that passing the Turing Test would not be sufficient to prove that a computer program was intelligent because a trivial program could do it, namely, the “Humongous-Table (HT) Program”, which simply looks up in a table what to say next. This claim is examined in detail. Three ground rules are argued for: (1) That the HT program must be exhaustive, and not be based on some vaguely imagined set of tricks. (2) That the HT (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The B-I-C-a of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures.Andrea Stocco, Christian Lebiere & Alexei V. Samsonovich - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2):171-192.
  • Consciousness and Virtuality.Giuseppe Trautteur - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):69-73.