The paper continues the earlier Education and the Educational Project I: the atmosphere of postmodernism.1 Following the later Wittgenstein a different view of human action, emphasising the educator's intention, is argued for. A conception of education as the ongoing discussion of mankind is outlined and, drawing on Frankfurt's view of the importance of what we care about, the idea of an educational project is re-conceived. It is concluded that neither parents nor teachers can do without this idea, but that it (...) cannot be thought of as determining deductively and exhaustively all practical decisions concerning educational matters. Postmodernism therefore seems to be only nearly right about education. (shrink)

The paper continues the earlier Education and the Educational Project I: the atmosphere of postmodernism.1 Following the later Wittgenstein a different view of human action, emphasising the educator’s intention, is argued for. A conception of education as the ongoing discussion of mankind is outlined and, drawing on Frankfurt’s view of the importance of what we care about, the idea of an educational project is re-conceived. It is concluded that neither parents nor teachers can do without this idea, but that it (...) cannot be thought of as determining deductively and exhaustively all practical decisions concerning educational matters. Postmodernism therefore seems to be only nearly right about education. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that the criticism of the Enlightenment project in education and the disappearance in the philosophy of education discourse of particular educational problems which confront practitioners has resulted in a philosophy of education which — as a kind of Spielerei — begs the question. To revitalize itself, philosophy of education must take up anew its perennial mission, one near to specific educational problems. In explaining how the “I” of the educator can be conceived after postmodernism, (...) this study elaborates the concepts of “integrity” and “particularity” as relevant for education. Education itself is conceived as a personal relation with a real person that aids in developing individuality. It is concluded that this answer is an authoritative and authentic response from one individual to another within a particular situation. (shrink)

Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles. However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions and their features. Such action-centred particularism is, I argue, compatible with generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘Be X’ but rejects any implication that the relevant X-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.

In recent educational reforms in New Zealand, a central assumption has been the existence of a free and autonomous chooser acting as a consumer of education. The present paper examines and critiques this notion of autonomy, as developed within liberal theory. Both Foucault and Lyotard provide materials for this critique of such a self, a self independent of the laws and principles of a community.

(1997). Michel Foucault: Problematising the individual and constituting ‘the’ self. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 32-49. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1997.tb00526.x.

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the role of exemplarity in education through a conceptualisation of two different dimensions of exemplarity in educational practice. Pedagogical exemplarity, which relates to the pedagogical and ethical dimension of educational practice. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when someone takes up an exemplary function in educational practice. Didactical exemplarity, which relates to the exemplary function of subject matter or educational content. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when something takes up an (...) exemplary function in educational practice. Through an initial conceptual exploration of these two dimensions, via the works of Linda Zagzebski and Martin Wagenschein, the paper sets out to lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of the role of exemplarity in education. (shrink)

In this paper, the notion of pearl diving as a metaphor for historical methodology is explored as a possible conceptual contribution to pedagogical thinking and practice. Pearl diving in the thinking of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin refers to a process of bringing to life and coming to terms with a fragmented past, and requires of the thinker a form of Homeric impartiality. This they contrast with the processual and functional modern understanding of historiography, where events and things are subsumed (...) by a causal linearity. According to Arendt and Benjamin, our past cannot be understood as though in one piece, but should rather be engaged as fragmented and crystallised into events—or pearls—which can be retrieved and can help us to illuminate our past and to understand our present. This paper considers what such an approach would entail for pedagogical theory and practice, as well as for the work of the pedagogical thinker and the teacher. (shrink)