Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Husserl's Notion of Sensation and Merleau-Ponty's Critique.Ka-Wing Leung - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):35-49.
    ABSTRACTMerleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception begins with a critique of the philosophical notion of sensation. Even though it is often generally said to be aimed at traditional psychology or empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s critique is without question also applicable to Husserl’s notion of sensation. The first half of this paper will offer an interpretation of Husserl’s conception of sensation as the stuff of perception and the pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. And then it will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s critique in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Hyle of Imagination and Reproductive Consciousness: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Phantasy Reconsidered.Ka-yu Hui - 2022 - Husserl Studies 38 (3):273–292.
    The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema (_Auffassung/Auffassungsinhalt Schema_) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (_Phantasie_), commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Mindfulness: the feeling of being tuned-in, and related phenomena : phenomenological reflections of a Buddhist practitioner.Erol Copelj - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    This work develops a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. It is divided into two main parts. The aim of part one is to articulate a pre-phenomenological sketch of mindfulness by drawing on passages from some of the classic works of Western literature and everyday life, through an interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and by the means of a critical analysis of the contemporary attempts to account for these phenomena. Part two adds further detail to the sketch by entering (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Is There Something Like a ('Raw') Visual Sensation?Andrea Marchesi - 2015 - Archivio Di Filosofia 83 (3):151-160.
    Regarding Husserl’s analysis of perception, the validity of concepts like visual sensation and ‘raw’, viz. ‘unapprehended’ sensation has been questioned. In this paper I discuss the issue with two American interpreters of Husserlian phenomenology: William McKenna and Quentin Smith, who respectively defend and criticize Husserl’s account. My aim is to show that their attempts remain controversial. Moreover, I will mention a textual source in which Husserl indirectly justifies the existence of visual sensations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations