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Joel Smith (2006). Bodily Awareness, Imagination, and the Self.

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  1.  9
    Crossed Wires About Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.
    Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of the (...)
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  2. Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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  3.  41
    IX—Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness.Louise Richardson - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):147-165.
    Bodily awareness is a kind of perceptual awareness of the body that we do not usually count as a sense. I argue that that there is an overlooked agential difference between bodily awareness and perception in the five familiar senses: a difference in what is involved in perceptual activity in sight, hearing, touch taste and smell on the one hand, and bodily awareness on the other.
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  4. Egocentric Space.Joel Smith - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):409-433.
    I discuss the relation between egocentric spatial representation and the capacity for bodily activity, with specific reference to Merleau-Ponty.
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    Imagining and Fiction: Some Issues.Kathleen Stock - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):887-896.
    In this paper, I survey in some depth three issues arising from the connection between imagination and fiction: (i) whether fiction can be defined as such in terms of its prescribing imagining; (ii) whether imagining in response to fiction is de se, or de re, or both; (iii) the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ and various explanations for it. Along the way I survey, more briefly, several other prominent issues in this area too.
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  6. Can Transcendental Intersubjectivity Be Naturalised?Joel Smith - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):91-111.
    I discuss Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. I focus on the problem of perceived similarity. I argue that recent work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, concerning intermodal representation and the mirror neuron system, fails to constitute a naturalistic solution to the problem. This can be seen via a comparison between the Husserlian project on the one hand and Molyneux’s Question on the other.
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    Uniting the Perspectival Subject: Two Approaches.Patrick Stokes - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):23-44.
    Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization, imply a notional subject of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the actual subject, the person actually doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere imagined seeing. I consider two approaches to this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, (...)
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