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Rejection

Analysis 56 (1):1–9 (1996)

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  1. Knot and Tonk: Nasty Connectives on Many-Valued Truth-Tables for Classical Sentential Logic.Tim Button - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):7-19.
    Prior’s Tonk is a famously horrible connective. It is defined by its inference rules. My aim in this article is to compare Tonk with some hitherto unnoticed nasty connectives, which are defined in semantic terms. I first use many-valued truth-tables for classical sentential logic to define a nasty connective, Knot. I then argue that we should refuse to add Knot to our language. And I show that this reverses the standard dialectic surrounding Tonk, and yields a novel solution to the (...)
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  • Weak Rejection.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):741-760.
    ABSTRACTLinguistic evidence supports the claim that certain, weak rejections are less specific than assertions. On the basis of this evidence, it has been argued that rejected sentences cannot be premisses and conclusions in inferences. We give examples of inferences with weakly rejected sentences as premisses and conclusions. We then propose a logic of weak rejection which accounts for the relevant phenomena and is motivated by principles of coherence in dialogue. We give a semantics for which this logic is sound and (...)
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  • What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  • A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
    I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...)
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  • Alfarabi on Conditionals.Kamran Karimullah - 2014 - Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 24 (2):211-267.
  • Logic in the Tractatus.Max Weiss - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1):1-50.
    I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...)
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  • Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen.Julien Murzi & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):480-488.
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...)
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  • Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!Fabien Schang & James Trafford - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (2):225-251.
    This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motivations for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to logic, which is formalized in a Question–Answer Semantics. We develop a generalized account of rejectivism through close consideration of Mark Textor's arguments against rejectivism that the negative expression ‘No’ is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force indicators.
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  • Normality, Non-Contamination and Logical Depth in Classical Natural Deduction.Marcello D’Agostino, Dov Gabbay & Sanjay Modgil - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-67.
    In this paper we provide a detailed proof-theoretical analysis of a natural deduction system for classical propositional logic that represents classical proofs in a more natural way than standard Gentzen-style natural deduction, admits of a simple normalization procedure such that normal proofs enjoy the Weak Subformula Property, provides the means to prove a Non-contamination Property of normal proofs that is not satisfied by normal proofs in the Gentzen tradition and is useful for applications, especially in formal argumentation, naturally leads to (...)
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  • Implicit Definition and the Application of Logic.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):131-148.
    The paper argues that the theory of Implicit Definition cannot give an account of knowledge of logical principles. According to this theory, the meanings of certain expressions are determined such that they make certain principles containing them true; this is supposed to explain our knowledge of the principles as derived from our knowledge of what the expressions mean. The paper argues that this explanation succeeds only if Implicit Definition can account for our understanding of the logical constants, and that fully (...)
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  • On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did Not Believe or Want ….Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.
    Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg-raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not-p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to (...)
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  • Negation, Denial, and Rejection.David Ripley - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):622-629.
    At least since [Frege, 1960] and [Geach, 1965], there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejection, rather than vice versa. Some (...)
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  • Compositionality Solves Carnap’s Problem.Denis Bonnay & Dag Westerståhl - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):721-739.
    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the (...)
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  • An Expressivist Bilateral Meaning-is-Use Analysis of Classical Propositional Logic.John Cantwell - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (1):27-51.
    The connectives of classical propositional logic are given an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions of acceptance and rejection, i.e. the connectives are analyzed within an expressivist bilateral meaning-is-use framework. It is explained how such a framework differs from standard inferentialist frameworks and it is argued that it is better suited to address the particular issues raised by the expressivist thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the mental state that it is conventionally used to (...)
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  • Bilateralism Does Not Provide a Proof Theoretic Treatment of Classical Logic.Michael Gabbay - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:S108-S122.
    In this short paper I note that a key metatheorem does not hold for the bilateralist inferential framework: harmony does not entail consistency. I conclude that the requirement of harmony will not suffice for a bilateralist to maintain a proof theoretic account of classical logic. I conclude that a proof theoretic account of meaning based on the bilateralist framework has no natural way of distinguishing legitimate definitional inference rules from illegitimate ones (such as those for tonk). Finally, as an appendix (...)
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  • Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge.Guy Longworth - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):50–79.
    Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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  • ‘Thereby We Have Broken with the Old Logical Dualism’ – Reinach on Negative Judgement and Negation.Mark Textor - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):570 - 590.
    Does (affirmative) judgement have a logical dual, negative judgement? Whether there is such a logical dualism was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege argued in ?Negation? (1918/9) that logic can dispense with negative judgement. Frege's arguments shaped the views of later generations of analytic philosophers, but they will not have convinced such opponents as Brentano or Windelband. These philosophers believed in negative judgement for psychological, not logical, reasons. Reinach's ?On the Theory of Negative Judgement? (1911) spoke (...)
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  • Is 'No' a Force-Indicator? Sometimes, Possibly.Luca Incurvati & Peter Smith - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):225-231.
    Some bilateralists have suggested that some of our negative answers to yes-or-no questions are cases of rejection. Mark Textor (2011. Is ‘no’ a force-indicator? No! Analysis 71: 448–56) has recently argued that this suggestion falls prey to a version of the Frege-Geach problem. This note reviews Textor's objection and shows why it fails. We conclude with some brief remarks concerning where we think that future attacks on bilateralism should be directed.
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  • Rejection and Valuations.Luca Incurvati & Peter Smith - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):3 - 10.
    Timothy Smiley’s wonderful paper ‘Rejection’ (1996) is still perhaps not as well known or well understood as it should be. This note first gives a quick presentation of themes from that paper, though done in our own way, and then considers a putative line of objection – recently advanced by Julien Murzi and Ole Hjortland (2009) – to one of Smiley’s key claims. Along the way, we consider the prospects for an intuitionistic approach to some of the issues discussed in (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • A Paradox of Rejection.Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4451-4464.
    Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned (...)
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  • Russell on Negative Judgement.Anssi Korhonen - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    This paper concerns Bertrand Russell’s changing views on negative judgement. ‘Negative judgement’ is considered in the context of three theories of judgement that Russell put forth at different times: a dual relation theory ; a multiple relation theory ; a psychological theory of judgement. Four issues are singled out for a more detailed discussion: quality dualism versus quality monism, that is, the question whether judgement comes in two kinds, acceptance and rejection, or whether there is only one judgement-quality ; the (...)
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  • Is 'No' a Force-Indicator? No!M. Textor - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):448-456.
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  • Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
    This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning---one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions---and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system---ST---that conservatively extends classical (...)
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  • Failures of Categoricity and Compositionality for Intuitionistic Disjunction.Jack Woods - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):281-291.
    I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.
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  • Unity and Autonomy in Expressivist Logic.John Cantwell - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):443-457.
    It is argued that expressivists can solve their problems in accounting for the unity and autonomy of logic – logic is topic independent and does not derive from a general ‘logic’ of mental states – by adopting an analysis of the logical connectives that takes logically complex sentences to express complex combinations of simple attitudes like belief and disapproval and dispositions to form such simple attitudes upon performing suppositional acts, and taking acceptance and rejection of sentences to be the common (...)
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  • On Rules of Inference and the Meanings of Logical Constants.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):282-287.
    In the theory of meaning, it is common to contrast truth-conditional theories of meaning with theories which identify the meaning of an expression with its use. One rather exact version of the somewhat vague use-theoretic picture is the view that the standard rules of inference determine the meanings of logical constants. Often this idea also functions as a paradigm for more general use-theoretic approaches to meaning. In particular, the idea plays a key role in the anti-realist program of Dummett and (...)
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  • Denial and Disagreement.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Topoi (1):1-11.
    We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...)
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  • On All Strong Kleene Generalizations of Classical Logic.Stefan Wintein - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (3):503-545.
    By using the notions of exact truth and exact falsity, one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic, the Logic of Paradox and First Degree Entailment, the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar (...)
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  • The Case of the Disappearing Semicolon: Expressive-Assertivism and the Embedding Problem.Thorsten Sander - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):959-979.
    Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.
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  • Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions.Ben Martin - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):253-267.
    Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an (...)
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  • Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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  • What is a Non-Truth-Functional Logic?João Marcos - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (2):215-240.
    What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (...)
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  • Structured Propositions as Types.Peter W. Hanks - 2011 - Mind 120 (477):11-52.
    In this paper I defend an account of the nature of propositional content according to which the proposition expressed by a declarative sentence is a certain type of action a speaker performs in uttering that sentence. On this view, the semantic contents of proper names turn out to be types of reference acts. By carefully individuating these types, it is possible to provide new solutions to Frege’s puzzles about names in identity- and belief-sentences.
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  • The Revival of Rejective Negation.Lloyd Humberstone - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):331-381.
    Whether assent ("acceptance") and dissent ("rejection") are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege's, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in (...)
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  • Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  • Why Conclusions Should Remain Single.Florian Steinberger - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):333-355.
    This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because they fail (...)
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  • First Order Expressivist Logic.John Cantwell - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1381-1403.
    This paper provides finitary jointly necessary and sufficient acceptance and rejection conditions for the logical constants of a first order quantificational language. By introducing the notion of making an assignment as a distinct object level practice—something you do with a sentence—(as opposed to a meta-level semantic notion) and combining this with the practice of (hypothetical and categorical) acceptance and rejection and the practice of making suppositions one gains a structure that is sufficiently rich to fully characterize the class of classical (...)
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