Most theory in business ethics is still steeped in rationalist and moral-realist assumptions. However, some seminal neuroscientific studies point to the primacy of moral emotions and intuition in shaping moral judgment. In line with previous interpretations, I suggest that a dual-system explanation of emotional-intuitive automaticity and deliberative reasoning is the most appropriate view. However, my interpretation of the evidence also contradicts Greene’s conclusion that nonconsequentialist decision making is primarily sentimentalist or affective at its core, while utilitarianism is largely rational-deliberative. Instead, (...) I propose that current research on the human brain, in conjunction with converging experimental evidence, hints at moral subjectivism and its evolutionary basis as the most persuasive explanation of morality. These anti-realist conjectures have far-reaching implications for a wide range of topics in business ethics, as illustrated with the specific case of corporate social responsibility as a potentially tribal conception of the good. (shrink)

The core of the paper consists of dialogue from a true case where an employee experienced moral dilemmas following a disquieting directive from his manager. The case is considered from the perspective of Dancy's particularistic theory of moral reasons. This case was chosen not to illustrate the theory, but rather to test the assumption that an approach to moral judgement based on Ross and Dancy has general applicability. It is suggested that, in its simplest form, that approach approximates to the (...) manner in which people in organisations, without prior knowledge of ethical theorising, would ordinarily deal with comparable situations, and so it can be relatively easy to learn given practice. Based on this case, some insight is also offered into individuals' moral learning, including their need for personal qualities such as assertiveness and independence of mind. In that context a reciprocal relationship between Dancy's approach and Werhane's thinking on moral imagination is suggested. (shrink)

Learning to address moral dilemmas is important for participants on courses in business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While modern, rule-based ethical theory often provides the normative input here, this has faced criticism in its application. In response, post-modern and Aristotelian perspectives have found favour. This paper follows a similar line, presenting an approach based initially on a critical interpretation of Ross's theory of prima facie duties, which emphasises moral judgement in actual situations. However, the retention of a modern (...) element is suggested, with an invitation to hypothetically universalise detailed proposals for action, following Hare. This further step may reassure students/managers who seek additional closure in their decision-making. Some pedagogical implications are also briefly raised regarding the use of case material and the need to recognise questions of social interaction and personal character as features of dilemma resolution in actual organisational contexts. (shrink)

Learning to address moral dilemmas is important for participants on courses in business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While modern, rule‐based ethical theory often provides the normative input here, this has faced criticism in its application. In response, post‐modern and Aristotelian perspectives have found favour. This paper follows a similar line, presenting an approach based initially on a critical interpretation of Ross's theory of prima facie duties, which emphasises moral judgement in actual situations. However, the retention of a modern (...) element is suggested, with an invitation to hypothetically universalise detailed proposals for action, following Hare. This further step may reassure students/managers who seek additional closure in their decision‐making. Some pedagogical implications are also briefly raised regarding the use of case material and the need to recognise questions of social interaction and personal character as features of dilemma resolution in actual organisational contexts. (shrink)

Background: The pharmaceutical industry has been responsible for major medical advances, but the industry has also been heavily criticized. Such criticisms, and associated regulatory responses, are no doubt often warranted, but do not provide a framework for those who wish to reason systematically about the moral dimensions of drug development. We set out to develop such a framework using Beauchamp and Childress's “four principles” as organizing categories. Methods: We conducted a qualitative interview study of people working in the “medical affairs” (...) departments of pharmaceutical companies to determine: (1) whether our data could meaningfully be organized under the headings of “autonomy,” “beneficence,” “nonmaleficence,” and “justice”; (2) how principles might be expressed in this particular commercial setting; and (3) if these principles are expressed, whether and how competing principles are balanced. We then critiqued these findings using existing normative theory. Results: Our interviews demonstrated that three of Beauchamp and Childress's four principles were salient to our participants: beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Within each of these principles, participants had two broad ethical orientations: an altruistic public focus (“other-ness”) and a commitment to their companies (“firm-ness”). Our participants also demonstrated efforts to balance these principles and highlighted the importance of phronesis (or practical wisdom) in balancing and enacting principles. Notably, however, our participants did not spontaneously emphasize the importance of autonomy. Conclusions: It is possible to use qualitative empirical research, together with normative analysis, to derive a framework for pharmaceutical ethics. We suggest that our framework would be useful for those who wish to reason ethically within, or in collaboration with, the pharmaceutical industry. (shrink)

Does the content of a physically dangerous job affect the moral permissibility of hiring for that job? To what extent may employers consider costs in choosing workplace safety measures? Drawing on Kantian ethical theory, this article defends two strong ethical standards of workplace safety. First, the content of a hazardous job does indeed affect the moral permissibility of offering it. Unless employees need hazard pay to meet basic needs, it is permissible to offer a dangerous job only if prospective employees (...) have a reason other than hazard pay to choose this job instead of safer alternatives. Second, employers typically cannot justify omitting expensive safety measures by paying employees more, even if employees prefer higher pay to greater safety. Employers offering dangerous jobs must meet these two standards to avoid treating their employees merely as means. (shrink)