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Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study.Gila Sher - 2019 - In Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? de Gruyter Studium. pp. 37-57.details
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Virtue Perspectivism, Externalism, and Epistemic Circularity.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag. pp. 123-140.details
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Truth, value and epistemic expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.details
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El argumento modal de Moore contra el escepticismo.Javier Vilanova Arias - 2010 - Análisis Filosófico 30 (2):221-244.details
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When Is a Belief Formed in an Epistemically Circular Way?Todd M. Stewart - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3):336-353.details
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Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
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Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Scott Scheall - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.details
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Beyond truth and falsehood: The real value of knowing that P.Wayne D. Riggs - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):87--108.details
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Why we should prefer knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93.details
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Epistemic circularity squared? Skepticism about common sense.Baron Reed - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.details
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What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.details
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Epistemic action, extended knowledge, and metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.details
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Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.details
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Putting knowledge in its place: virtue, value, and the internalism/externalism debate.Philip R. Olson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):241-261.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.details
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Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.details
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‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term.Victor Kumar - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):439-457.details
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Sosa in perspective.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.details
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Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.details
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Computation, coherence, and ethical reasoning.Marcello Guarini - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):27-46.details
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Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):89-105.details
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Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.details
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Antiskeptical conditionals.Theodore J. Everett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details
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The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content.Jérôme Dokic - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):153-169.details
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Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore.Cláudio de Almeida - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):48-73.details
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Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417-430.details
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Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4989-5007.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.details
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Sosa on scepticism. [REVIEW]Jessica Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.details
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Reflective luck and belief ownership.Daniel Breyer - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154.details
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Utilitarian epistemology.Steve Petersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.details
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Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism.Sven Bernecker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.details
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Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.details
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Ernest sosa’nin erdem epi̇stemoloji̇si̇.Kemal Batak - 2016 - Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 18 (34):1-1.details
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Is a Fully General Theory of Knowledge Possible?Robert P. Amico - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):307-322.details
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La fe sobrenatural y el valor epistemológico del testimonio.José Tomás Alvarado - 2017 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 1 (1):148-170.details
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Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.details
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Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.details
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Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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