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Phenomenology of Social Cognition

Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089 (2015)

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  1. Phenomenology of Social Explanation.Shannon Spaulding - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The orthodox view of social cognition maintains that mentalizing is an important and pervasive element of our ordinary social interactions. The orthodoxy has come under scrutiny from various sources recently. Critics from the phenomenological tradition argue that phenomenological reflection on our social interactions tells against the orthodox view. Proponents of pluralistic folk psychology argue that our ordinary social interactions extend far beyond mentalizing. Both sorts of critics argue that emphasis in social cognition research ought to be on other elements of (...)
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  • The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level.Heath Williams - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    I begin this paper by demonstrating that there is a perceived overlap between phenomenology and the personal level. This perception has recently played a decisive role in evaluating phenomenological contributions to discussions within cognitive science, for example, on topics of social cognition. In this paper, I aim not only to understand what might be meant by associating phenomenology with the personal level, but to cast this association in a critical light. I show that the personal level is essentially an explanatory (...)
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  • Constructing Persons: On the Personal–Subpersonal Distinction.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-29.
    What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me’ and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level—the plurality problem. The things that plausibly qualify (...)
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  • Is Husserl Guilty of Sellars’ Myth of the Sensory Given.Heath Williams - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6371-6389.
    This paper shows that Husserl is not guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given. I firstly show that Husserl’s account of ‘sensations’ or ‘sense data’ seems to possess some of the attributes Sellars’ myth critiques. In response I show that, just as Sellars thinks that our ‘conceptual capacities’ afford us an awareness of a logical perceptual space that has a propositional structure, Husserl thinks that ‘acts of apprehension’ structure sensations to afford us perception that is similarly propositionally structured. Not (...)
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  • The Personal and the Subpersonal in the Theory of Mind Debate.Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):305-324.
    It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...)
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  • How We Think and Act Together.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):298-314.
    In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which (...)
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  • Shannon Spaulding, "How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition." Reviewed By.Frank Scalambrino - 2019 - Philosophy in Review 39 (2):105-107.
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