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  1. What is Meta-Cognitive Skill? Kindling a Conversation Between Culadasa and Contemporary Philosophy of Psychology.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2018 - Contemporary Buddhism 19 (2):476-492.
    ABSTRACTI explore affinities and tensions between Culadasa’s model of meta-cognitive skill, in his recent The Mind Illuminated, and theories of skill and meta-cognition in contemporary philosophy of psychology. I find that, while there are many assumptions that these different approaches share, for the most part, contemporary philosophy of psychology has ignored the possibility that meta-cognitive skills can be cultivated through practice, as Culadasa persuasively argues. The one exception is Joëlle Proust’s recent The Philosophy of Metacognition. This work defends a model (...)
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  • Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...)
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  • In Experts, Underlying Processes That Drive Visuomotor Adaptation Are Different Than in Novices.Christian Leukel, Albert Gollhofer & Wolfgang Taube - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  • Recent Insights Into Perceptual and Motor Skill Learning.Lior Shmuelof & John W. Krakauer - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  • Replies.Jason Stanley - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):497-511.
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  • Non-Rational Aspects of Skilled Agency.Yannig Luthra - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2267-2289.
    This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful action, (...)
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  • Is Episodic Memory Uniquely Human? Evaluating the Episodic-Like Memory Research Program.Sarah Malanowski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1433-1455.
    Recently, a research program has emerged that aims to show that animals have a memory capacity that is similar to the human episodic memory capacity. Researchers within this program argue that nonhuman animals have episodic-like memory of personally experienced past events. In this paper, I specify and evaluate the goals of this research program and the progress it has made in achieving them. I will examine some of the data that the research program has produced, as well as the operational (...)
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  • Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...)
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  • The Spontaneousness of Skill and the Impulsivity of Habit.Christos Douskos - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The objective of this paper is to articulate a distinction between habit and bodily skill as different ways of acting without deliberation. I start by elaborating on a distinction between habit and skill as different kinds of dispositions. Then I argue that this distinction has direct implications for the varieties of automaticity exhibited in habitual and skilful bodily acts. The argument suggests that paying close attention to the metaphysics of agency can help to articulate more precisely questions regarding the varieties (...)
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  • Embodied Savoir-Faire: Knowledge-How Requires Motor Representations.Neil Levy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
    I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to \ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, (...)
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  • They’Ve Lost Control: Reflections on Skill.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.
    In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of (...)
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  • Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):101-26.
    This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention-attention nexus, we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so that we have a uniform explanation of basic cases of causal deviance in action as (...)
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  • Induction and Knowledge-What.Peter Gärdenfors & Andreas Stephens - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-21.
    Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that (...)
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  • Intellectualism and the Argument From Cognitive Science.Arieh Schwartz & Zoe Drayson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that (...)
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  • Pollard on Habits of Action.Christos Douskos - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):504-524.
    Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of (...)
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  • Induction and Knowledge-What.Peter Gärdenfors & Andreas Stephens - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):471-491.
    Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that (...)
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  • Cognition in Skilled Action: Meshed Control and the Varieties of Skill Experience.Wayne Christensen, John Sutton & Doris J. F. McIlwain - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):37-66.
    We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cognitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory provides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further (...)
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  • Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  • How to Be Skilful: Opportunistic Robustness and Normative Sensitivity.Andrew Buskell - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1445-1466.
    In a recent article, Fridland characterises a central capacity of skill users, an aspect she calls ‘control’. Control, according to Fridland, is evidenced in the way in which skill users are able to marshal a variety of mental and bodily resources in order to keep skill deployment operating fluidly and appropriately. According to Fridland, two prevalent contemporary accounts of skill—Stanley & Krakauer’s and Hubert Dreyfus’s —fail to account for the features of control, and do so necessarily. While I agree with (...)
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  • Do We Reflect While Performing Skillful Actions? Automaticity, Control, and the Perils of Distraction.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):896-924.
    From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...)
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  • New Learning of Music After Bilateral Medial Temporal Lobe Damage: Evidence From an Amnesic Patient.Jussi Valtonen, Emma Gregory, Barbara Landau & Michael McCloskey - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.