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  1. In praise of a logic of definitions that tolerates ω‐inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
    I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, S, under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that S yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of S to the theory of truth.
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  • Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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